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THE SECURITY ASPECTS OF CONDITIONAL SALES
IN SWEDEN WITH A COMPARISON OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CLAES GUNNAR LOUIS BEYER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Conditional sales can be approached from two points of view: the
seller-buyer relationship and the social impact of installment sales
and their related problems, or the conditional sale as a financing device
and the question of the seller's secured position by virtue of the con-
ditional sales contract. This article will deal with the latter point of
view, considering in the main, Swedish law, the relevant provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code and their basic differences in approach,
A. History of the Conditional Sale in Sweden
The conditional sale is both old and young in Swedish law. It is
old in the sense that it was recognized as a valid means of securing
payment in the beginning of the eighteenth century.' A literal transla-
tion of the Swedish phrase that corresponds to "conditional sale"
would be "sale under retention of ownership." As a result, when
Swedish lawyers discuss problems in this area, they generally speak
only of "retention of ownership." This has not had the effect of re-
moving the discussion from the context of sales, but it probably has
something to do with the fact that, with few exceptions, the problem
has been treated as one of ownership or transfer of ownership.
The legal writers during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
mentioned and condoned the conditional sale. The great law commis-
sions that were at work in Sweden during the nineteenth century with
* Swedish law degree (Juris Kandidat) 1961, University of Lund, Sweden; LL.M.
1962, University of Illinois; studied at the Institute of Comparative Law of the Uni-
versity of Paris.
1 Almen, Om kop och byte av los egendom (On Sale and Barter of Personal
Property) (4th ed. 1960) (hereinafter cited as Almen) 412 n.I43; Under), Svensk sakritt
I. Los egendom (Swedish Rights in Rem. I, Personal Property) (3d ed. 1955) (here-
inafter cited as Unden) 102 n.82.
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the purpose of giving Sweden a new code (it was never enacted) also
mentioned the conditional sale. However, most of the statements are
brief and do not give reasons or contain proposals for the theory of the
conditional sale. 2 Practically all of them note the conditional sale in
connection with the problem of the seller's rights as against the buyer
and his creditors after a contract of sale has been concluded but where
the goods have not been delivered nor payment made.' Most of these
writers agree that in this position the seller has the right to keep the
goods if the buyer goes bankrupt. He does not have to deliver the
goods according to the contract and seek payment for them in competi-
tion with other creditors. In this light, the conditional sale is viewed as
the extension of this right. in that the goods have been delivered and
the seller has retained ownership rights under the contract.
It can also be said that conditional sales is descriptively young
since it did not attract the interest of the legal scholars nor find its way
into common usage until late in the nineteenth century.' One of its
most distinguished advocates was Tore Almen who perhaps furnished
the most widely accepted theory of the conditional sale.
The installment sale, as it relates to conditional sales was intro-
duced and fostered in Sweden as a result of the Singer sewing machine.
Exported from the United States, it was sold all over the world through
conditional sales.' However, as with all commercial innovation, dif-
ficulties ensued and to cope with the problems emanating from the
installment sales business, the Swedish Installment Sales Act' was
enacted in 1915. This was substantially amended in 1953.
B. Theories of Swedish Legal Writers
1. Almen. Almen's ideas were directly derived from his theory
concerning the situation where neither transfer of possession nor pay-
ment for the goods has taken place. About this situation he says: "The
buyer acquires a right of ownership conditioned by the payment of the
price."' And later he writes about the conditional sale: "The legal
relation might be construed to mean that both the seller and the buyer
have a conditioned right of ownership to the goods. The buyer has a
right of ownership suspensively conditioned by the payment, the seller,
a right of ownership resolutorily dependent on the same condition."'
Almen probably derived the main parts of his theory from Torp, a
2 Schmidt, Om agarefOrbehAll och avbetalningskiip (On Conditional Sales and
Installment Sales) (hereinafter cited as Schmidt) 93-96.
• 3 Lag den 11 Juni 1915 om avbetalningskiip (1T 28).
4 Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, Avdelning II (hereinafter cited as NJA II) 296 at 300
(1915); Schmidt, supra note 2, at 93-96.
5 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 10-11.
6 Lag den 11 juni 1915 om avbetalningskOp.
I Alm6n, supra note 1, at 151.
8 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 102.
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Danish scholar who developed a similar construction at the Tenth
Scandinavian Law Conference in 1902. There, Almen criticized Torp,
but apparently he later changed his mind. 9
Almen also had ideas about why the conditional sale existed and
argued in favor of its validity against the buyer's creditors and his
trustee in bankruptcy. As for the general reason for conditional sale,
he says that the seller must have some guarantee for the payment of
the price when the buyer can produce neither a surety nor a real estate
mortgage. The seller cannot get a mortgage in the goods sold because
of the rule in modern law that one can only get security in personal
property by taking it as a pledge. Consequently, the seller invented
the way of reserving his ownership in the goods so that he could take
them back if the buyer should default." As to the validity of the
conditional sales against creditors, he says that the "rule of modern
law" mentioned above might be alleged against such validity as well as
the principles underlying the Statute on Sales without Transfer of Pos-
session" (which provides for a very cumbersome filing system and
announcements in church, etc.). But he continues: "Between those
cases there is, after all, the important difference that in one case
goods that have belonged to the seller and still remain in his possession
should be withdrawn from his general creditors, whereas in the other
case, one should, give the buyer's creditors the right to seize goods to
which the seller never gave up his title although the buyer has the
possession." And he goes on to say that such a restriction of the free-
dom of contract would not be sufficiently justified by the argument that
the creditors might have looked to the goods in the buyer's possession
when they extended the credit.'
2: Unden. In his book on Rights in Rem. I. Personal Property, ,
Unden formulates a general theory on the transfer of title in sales,
treating conditional sales in immediate connection with this theory, but
offering no special construction of the conditional sale. He states that
transfer of ownership in a sale really presents two problems: (1) how
to solve a number of practical questions such as the rights of the
seller's creditors against the buyer, the rights of the buyer's creditors
against the seller, and the different parties' rights in a double sale;
(2) the characterization and systematization of the legal relations at
9 Id. at 100-02,
10 FOrslag till lag om avtal och andra rattshandlingar pa fOrmligenhetsrattens
omrade, lag em avbetalningsklip m.m. avgivna den 31 jan. 1914 av dirtill utsedda
kommitterade (Draftsmen's Comments on the Statute on Contracts and the Installment
Sales Act, etc.), (hereinafter cited as Fiirslag) 170 (1914). Almen distinguishes the con-
ditional sale from the chattel mortgage and the sale without transfer of possession by
stating that in the conditional sale case there is only newly acquired possession whereas
in the other case there is former title and former and present possession.
11 KF 20 nov. 1845 i ayscende pe handel om 1Ssoren, som koperen liter i saljirems
yard kvarhliva.
]2 Unden, supra note 1, at 179.
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different points in the sales process." His final answer to the first of
these problems is spelled out in the different chapters on special issues,
one of which is the conditional sale. As for the second problem, he
says: "The right of ownership as the totality of the powers that
generally are vested in an owner, is transferred immediately from the
seller to the buyer if the contract, the delivery and the payment are
made at the same time. Otherwise there is a successive transfer."'
However, he fails to discuss whether or not it is disadvantageous that,
according to Swedish law, the right of ownership is not established as
a unitarian right at a certain point of time. In construing the con-
ditional sale, he raises the question whether the seller can effectively
make the transfer dependent on a suspensive condition." As will be
pointed out later, there are problems involved in comparing Unden's
and Almen's use of the terms "suspensive" and "resolutory" con-
ditions." During his subsequent treatment of the problem he con-
sistently refers to the seller's right as "reserved" ownership and the
buyer's right as "conditioned" ownership." He also says that "the
seller's reserved ownership is limited by the buyer's conditioned owner-
ship."' This seems to indicate that both parties have some kind of
ownership, reciprocally limited and possibly a little stronger for the
seller than for the buyer.
When it comes to refuting the arguments against the validity of
conditional sales as to the buyer's creditors, Unden has some interesting
things to say. Unden, like Almen, anticipates the argument: "We do
not recognize the validity of pledges without transfer of possession.
We recognize sales without transfer of possession only if extensive
publication measures are taken. Why should we recognize the seller's
title when the buyer has possession?" linden answers that this is be-
cause the actual situation is so different. The possibility of sale or
pledge without transfer of possession would enable the debtor unduly
to prefer some creditors over others or would at least tempt the debtor
to dissipate these last assets in a final desperate effort to get money.
In a conditional sale the real situation is that the buyer needs a certain
thing and permits security in it until it is paid for. As he cannot resell
without criminal liability, the risk is fairly small that this kind of
transaction will hurt his creditors."
Unden looks at the conditional sale as part of the problem of
transfer of ownership, characterizes the rights of the parties as the
seller's reserved and the buyer's conditioned right of ownership,
13 Id. at 95.
14 Id. at 121-22.
15 Id. at 100. See discussion, infra p. 17, for definition of suspensive.
16 Supra, note S.
17 Unden, supra note 1 at 100-07, 122.
18 Id. at 106.
19 Id. at 101-02.
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compares it with other security transactions and sees the difference
in the fact that the conditional sale is a way to secure purchase
money.
3. Schmidt. Schmidt discusses the conditional sales theory in
two chapters of his book' entitled "Problems of Construction" and
"Aspects of Credit Security in Swedish Chattel Law." In the former
he first considers transfer of ownership and then goes on to examine
the construction problem of the conditional sale. He describes the dif-
ferent theories that have been expounded and critically analyzes
Almen's theory at length. A point of refutation is Almen's contention
that when the contract is concluded the seller has a resolutorily con-
ditioned right of ownership, the buyer a suspensively conditioned right
of ownership and the condition for both parties is the payment of the
purchase price. To this Schmidt replies: "If one accepts the meaning
of those types of condition that is generally attributed to them in legal
theory, the quoted passage would mean that the ownership of the
buyer is not established until the condition is fulfilled. The seller's
right of ownership on the other hand would remain unrestricted up to
the point where the condition is fulfilled and the right goes over to
the buyer." 2t Schmidt continues to say that this is obviously wrong,
since the buyer has some kind of right as soon as the contract is
concluded. He points out that this is what Alma really believes;
consequently, the construction does not suit Almen's own description.
When Almen says that the buyer has some kind of right at the con-
clusion of the contract he commits another error in assuming that this
right must be a right of ownership. Schmidt points out that it might
very well be some other kind of right. In this context, he refers back
to his general analysis of the transfer of ownership, wherein he argues
that "transfer of ownership" is a metaphorical way of speaking which
is not entirely correct. Ownership is a certain legal position in which
the seller at one time finds himself. When certain acts are done a
very similar kind of position is established for the buyer. But some
of the rights that the buyer acquires have never belonged to the
seller, such as cutting off the seller's creditors." Therefore, it is possible
that during the sale the buyer acquires some kind of right which is
not ownership and which the seller never had. 23
However, when it comes to deciding whether the label "con-
ditioned ownership" should be used to describe the buyer's and the
seller's rights in the conditional sale transaction, Schmidt says that
there can be no serious objections to this description. His reasons for
retaining it are that both courts and private individuals have a certain
20 Supra note 2.
21 Id. at 105.
22 Id. at 90-91.
23 Id. at 106-08.
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respect for the label "ownership," and, since it is good for practical
policy reasons that the buyer's right be secure as against the seller's
creditors, the label should be retained."
Under "Problems of Credit Security" Schmidt explores the reasons
for recognizing the validity of the conditional sale. He digests what
earlier writers have said on the subject; treats the impact on the open
credit standing of the debtor if different kinds of secured credit
were allowed; and finally discusses the reasons for the other types
of security transactions possible in Swedish law. He concludes with
a summary' in which he points out that any security device must
be judged on essentially two counts. First, does it give satisfactory
security to the creditor so that credit will be reasonably cheap under
the device in question? Second, are the advantages of this security
device so great that they outweigh the inevitable damage to the open
credit standing of the debtor? In a later chapter he giyes a positive
answer to the first," and presumably this can be taken as a positive
answer to the second.
4. Bergendal. In his interesting review" of Schmidt's book, Erik
Bergendal adopts an altogether different construction of the conditional
sale. He says that there is an obvious need for some kind of security
for purchase money in the goods sold. The retention-of-ownership
device was used only because sellers knew that a pledge without
possession would not be held valid. Actually the seller does not want
ownership of the goods; he only wants security for the purchase money
in the goods. Bergendal says that present Swedish law probably war-
rants the description of the seller's right as ownership, but maintains
that some of the legal effects that are supposed to follow from this
view actually do not follow. Therefore, he would prefer a statutory
change whereby the seller would get some kind of purchase money
chattel mortgage in the goods.
It, is difficult to follow Bergendal's line of thought. In the begin-
ning it appears as though he is going to maintain that the existing
Swedish law on conditional sales could better be described as a kind of
chattel security. Instead, he states that the existing rules should be
described as rules of transfer of ownership and that what he proposes
is a legislative change.
5. Evaluation. To evaluate the different theories set out above, it
might be wise to begin with a clearer investigation of the meaning
of the words "resolutory" and "suspensive" in connection with con-
24 Id. at 109.
25 Id. at 134-36.
26 Id. at 165.
27 Bergendal, Anmalan av Folke Schmidt: On agarefOrbehal1 och avbetalningskOp
(A Review of Schmidt), Svensk Juristtidning (the Swedish Law Review, hereinafter
cited as SvJT) 670 (1938).
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ditions. As we have seen, both Almen and Unden use the terms,
and part of the criticism that Schmidt voices builds on an inter-
pretation of those words. It is submitted that the confusion arises
from the slightly different context in which these terms were used
by the Swedish writers. In Finland and Sweden the terms are com-
monly connected with the effect of a legal act—a contract or the
like. A suspensive condition is one which must be fulfilled in order
to make the effect of the legal act occur; the effect is suspended until
the condition occurs. The happening of a resolutory condition, on the
other hand, nullifies the effect that came into force immediately when
the legal act was done.' This use of the two words is designed to
qualify the condition which, in this scheme, must be either the one
or the other."
However, in Fredrik Vinding Kruse's book, The Right of Prop-
erty," another use of the words "resolutory" and "suspensive" is
found. Kruse speaks about a situation where two persons have the
ownership of a thing "in such a way that A shall first and alone be
invested with the actual right to dispose, and that this right shall
subsequently be transferred to B." He then adds: "We may . . . state
the right of property of A to be subject to a resolutive condition as
the occurrence . . . of a certain event will resolve the right of A . . . and
. . . the right of property of B . . . [to be] subject to a suspensive con-
dition, and the same condition which brings the right of A to an end
keeps the right of B suspended as long as the condition is not fulfilled."
We see here a totally different use of the two words.' They are no
longer connected with a legal act, nor are they really used to qualify
different kinds of conditions since the same is called both a resolutory
and a suspensive condition. Rather they are used to qualify different
kinds of rights. If one adopts this meaning of the two words, the
results reached will be contra to Swedish law concerning contracts
to sell real property. This is because the use of resolutive conditions is
prohibited in such contracts whereas the use of suspensive conditions
is permitted." Such phrasing would be meaningless if the contract
stated that the property should go over from A to B when B reached
28 Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (hereinafter cited as Black) 365;
Kivimaki & YlOstalo, Larobok i Finlands civilratt. Allman del (Finland's Civil Law.
General Part) 227 (1961) ; Unden, Svensk sakratt II:1. Fast egendom (Swedish Rights
in Rem II:l. Real Property) (3d ed. 1961) (hereinafter cited as Unden 11:1) 112-13.
29 This classification comes rather close to the common law division of conditions:
(1) into conditions precedent which correspond to suspensive, and (2) conditions subse-
quent which correspond to resolutory.
3° Vinding Kruse, The Right of Property (Danish) 243 (1939).
31 The Swedish words are "resolutiv" and "suspensiv." Black uses the words
"resolutory" and "suspensive" whereas Vinding Kruse translates "resolutive" and
"suspensive." I will consistently use "resolutory."
32 Art. 2, ch. 1, of the Section on Land of the Code (jordabalken) ; Unden 1I:1,
supra note 28, at 110-16.
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majority because, in Vinding Kruse's terminology, this condition would
be both resolutive (for A) and consequently forbidden, and at the
same time suspensive (for B) and therefore permitted.
In terms of construction and policy of the conditional sale, it
would appear that Almon employs Vinding Kruse's terminology"
since his theory is thought to have come from the Danish jurist, Torp.
Almon states that the seller's right is "resolutory dependent on the
same condition" that suspensively conditions the buyer's right. Here,
the same condition receives both labels and this is irreconcilable with
the common Swedish theory.
It is probable that Schmidt did not fully notice the difference and
in criticising Almon, assumed that the meaning of the words was the
one generally used in legal theory. He notes a contradiction between
the construction where the seller has a right "without restriction"
until the condition is fulfilled and Almen's statements which point out
that immediately after the conclusion of the contract both parties
have some rights. But if Almon adopted Vinding Kruse's terminology
this contradiction does not exist because the import of this language
indicates that the right of ownership of the seller is not without re-
striction after the sale but rather, it is modified by the buyer's
"eventual" right.
Unden's concept of the transfer of ownership is very realistic.
He rejects the method, so common in earlier German and Swedish legal
writing, of determining the question of transfer of ownership on a
few recognized legal rules (such as where the buyer takes free of the
seller's creditors) or on a single act in the transaction (e.g., the trans-
fer of possession). He believes that all connected problems should be
solved first on their factual merits and that thereafter, those results
should be used to determine where and when the ownership goes over.
The need for this determination should then be purely systematical and
pedagogical.
In this scheme he treats the conditional sale as one of the con-
nected problems and, in discussing it, compares it with security
transactions such as the pledge and the sale without transfer of pos-
session. He spells out the detailed rules of the conditional sale as to
the rights of the buyer and seller in various situations. From the
terminology he employs ("seller's reserved and buyer's conditioned
ownership," "successive transfer of ownership") he indicates that the
parties have common ownership to the goods during the transaction.
This, however, seems somewhat at odds with his discussion of the
validity of conditional sales where his sole comparisons are to secured
33 I do not mean to say that Almon got his theory from Vinding Kruse, for
Almon published his theory before the first edition of "The Right of Property" was
published. But it is rather plausible that their terminology is derived from common
Danish sources.
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transactions." This indicates that the seller's right is a mere security
interest in the goods.
This disturbing lack of connection between the construction of
and the policy reasons for the conditional sale in the theories of the
Swedish writers has no parallel under the Uniform Commercial Code.
C. The Uniform Commercial Code
When one compares the UCC, he cannot use the term "conditional
sale," but must resort to descriptions like "similar transactions under
the UCC." This indicates an important break with earlier American con-
cepts. In Article 9, the UCC treats all transactions where the intention of
the parties is to give the creditor security in a chattel." Such a transac-
tion is called a "secured transaction."'" The classification of different
kinds of security transactions is new, and there is in the Code no class
entitled "conditional sales.""7 Therefore, the theory of the UCC in se-
cured transactions, which would have been conditional sales under
previous law, requires discussion.
The principal approach in the UCC is that it treats all
secured transactions as an integrated category comprising what was
formerly covered by chattel mortgage, conditional sales, trust receipts,
factor's liens, etc. 38 In so doing, it recognizes the general legitimacy of
secured financing and the need for a statutory scheme that makes the
arrangement of such financing simple and inexpensive. In other words,
the UCC does not share the formerly common hostility against the
secured creditor.'" What Article 9 furnishes is legal security and it is
an important point in the outlook of the Code that this concept is
distinguished from credit risk. The secured party retains his security
interest against unsecured creditors whether he polices his security
interest or not.' Even if he leaves the collateral in the unfettered
dominion of the debtor his legal priority will be preserved.
Although the UCC looks upon secured transactions as one in-
tegrated category, it does have different rules for the various kinds of
transactions. In this differentiation it does not use the terms con-
34
 In the Swedish language the same word is used to designate (1) the law of
pledge, and (2) the law concerning the whole area Of pledge, lien, mortgage, etc.
36 Spivack, Secured Transactions under the Uniform .
 Commercial Code 3, 4 (1960)
(hereinafter cited as Spivack).
36 See UCC § 9-301.
37
 This is not to say that the UCC prohibits the use of this term or invalidates a
transaction given that name by the parties, official comment 2 to UCC § 9-102. But the
Code itself classifies along other lines, and in the Code's analysis it does not matter
whether the transaction is a conditional safe in the pre-code sense of the word.
38 Spivack, supra note 35 at 1-2.
39
 Ibid. 2; Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel Security,•57 Yale L.J. 518, 761 (hereinafter
cited as Gilmore 8: Axelrod).
UCC § 9-206 and official comments. This is a conscious break with the doctrine
of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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ditional sales, chattel mortgage, assignment of accounts receivable, etc.
Those devices are regarded as conceptual and the UCC purports to
make its differentiation along functional rather than conceptual lines."
The basis for the classification in the UCC is mainly the type
and function of the collateral used" and the intended purpose of the
credit extended.' In this pattern the conditional sale can be classified
as a purchase money security interest." However, a car can be sold
under a conditional sale both between the manufacturer and the
dealer and between the dealer and the consumer. Prior to the UCC,
these two sales were regulated entirely by the same legal rules (in
the absence of a Retail Instalment Sales Act) but under the Code
different rules apply to different aspects of each transaction." In the
first sale the car is classified as inventory" and in the second, as con-
sumer goods.'"
The result is that the construction of the conditional sale under
the UCC is not made in terms of ownership, title or lien. The language
used to describe this type of transaction was invented for the Code
and does not have any reference to American law outside the Code. 48
The reason for recognizing the validity of the conditional sale is the
same as the reason favoring recognition of all secured transactions:
secured financing is an integral part of the American economy and
should be facilitated."
Also, prior to the UCC, American chattel security law was not
thought about as an "integrated category."50 There were many in-
coherent security devices of different historical origin, nonfunctional
in the sense that there was a device invented to suit each demand. For
example, the chattel mortgage was an attempt to borrow the mortgage
concept from real estate law and use it to meet the need for chattel
security." The result was a certain gap or discrepancy between the
construction of the device and the policy reason for having it. The
draftsmen of the Code, enjoying the freedom of making new law,
eliminated this type of inconsistency. In short, they made security
law functional by closing the gap. Employing new terminology which
41 Spivack, supra note 35 at 3-6.
42 Collateral is classified as goods; accounts, contract rights and general intangibles;
instruments, documents and chattel paper, UCC fit 9-105 & 9-106; cf. Spivack, supra note
35, at VIII.
43 Reference is made to the division in purchase money security interests, UCC
9-107 and other security interests.
44 UCC § 9-107.
45 E.g., UCC §1 9-307 & 9-312.
UCC § 9-109(4).
47 UCC § 9 - 109(1).
48 Official Comment 1 to UCC § 9-105.
49 Spivack, supra note 35 at 2.
50 Id. at 1.
51 Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 39, at 529.
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closely reflected the present social pattern in which commercial de-
vices should work ("consumer goods and inventory," "purchase money
security," etc.) the draftsmen laid a highly commendable foundation
for such a volatile body of law.
D. Closing the Gap in Sweden
For the Swedish law makers, the task is more formidable. Bound
by the existing case law and the language of the statutes, they must
formulate new rules and adopt theories of construction from a re-
stricted position which, considering the retention of the ownership
theory, might well be described as protracted.
The final question then is whether in Swedish theory it is possible
to use language which aptly describes what happens in a conditional
sale. Can this gap be closed without alienating this transaction too far
from the language and concepts found in the present day statutes, cases
and other sources of the law.
In resolving this, it must be borne in mind that the conditional
sale is functionally akin to both the sale and the secured transaction.
Viewed under the UCC, it has correctly been decided that it is the fact
of securing purchase 'money that the two are connected and since
the security aspect is more important than the sale, the result is better
termed a secured transaction. In Sweden it would be more appropriate
to say that the buyer has ownership of the goods and the seller a
security interest in the same goods when the contract is made. Such
a conclusion is based on rules which prevent the seller from taking
back the goods without giving the buyer the surplus after the goods
have satisfied the debt 52 and. on the Statute of Damages Caused by
Automobiles which places ownership liability on the buyer under a
conditional sale." •
A fortiori, in order to close the gap, the reference to the seller's
right in Swedish legal writing and forms of contract should be viewed
as a security interest, not a retention of ownership. The courts should
give this new clause the same legal effect afforded the retention of
ownership clause. This recommendation is not trouble-free, however,
in that the use of the words security interest might not square with the
language of certain statutes. A poignant example is the Rule of Priori-
ties (where the owner of goods in the debtor's possession is allowed
to take them from his possession or from the trustee in bankruptcy) 54
52 This is obviously so if the sale falls under the Installment Sales Act. But if not,
Article 37 of the Stattite on Contracts (Lag 11 juni 1915 on evtal och andra
faltshandlingar pa fOrmOgenhetsriittens omrAde) should work approximately the same
result.
53 Article 1, paragraph 3 of the statute mentioned (Lag 30 juni 1916 ang, ansvarighet
for skada i fOljd av automobiltrafik). The same kind of rule makes the buyer responsible
for the taking of the compulsory insurance on cars.
a4 Article 2 of chapter 17 of the Commercial Section of the Code (Handelshalken).
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because of the retention-of-ownership clauses. This can be avoided by
a: broad interpretation of the regulation on pledges" under the Rule
of Priorities. On the plus side, clauses such as the one in the Statute
on Damages Caused by Automobile would become unnecessary since
the new language would more realistically define the transaction.
II. THE AGREEMENT AND ITS VALIDITY
A. General Requirements for the Formation of
a Conditional Sale
The UCC has worked out a rather precise scheme as to how and
when the security interest comes into being. First, the transaction must
be incorporated in a signed writing describing the collateral." It is
then shaped over two distinct points of time, the attachment, when
the security interest comes into existence, and the perfection, when it
becomes protected against the interests of most third parties."
Under Swedish law the process is not so elaborate. Just exactly
when the security interest becomes valid between the parties and
against third parties is not discussed in the cases or in the books. The
governing rules, therefore, must be gleaned from the statutes and
cases, particularly the Swedish Act on Contracts of 1915. It is in-
teresting to note that Swedish law has no requirement of consideration
and generally speaking no Statute of Frauds." Neither is there any
parol evidence rule, for in all proceedings evidence can be introduced
to explain away the contents of a written contract.
Perhaps the best indicator as to when the security agreement is
effective between the parties and against third parties is the Sales Act
which adopts the conclusion of the contract as the applicable time.
Since the retention of ownership is always a clause in a sales contract,
the security agreement is valid only if the sales contract is valid. When
the contract is concluded, the seller has a duty to deliver the goods on
the agreed day (against the down payment if such was contracted
for)." If the buyer becomes bankrupt before the goods are delivered,
the seller, according to articles 39 and 40 of the Sales Act, has a right
to demand security for the price. Once obtaining this security, he must
be deemed to be under a duty to deliver the goods. On the other hand,
55 Article 3 of chapter 17 of the Commercial Section of the Code: "If anyone has
a pledge in his possession he will enjoy payment out of the pledge before anyone else."
56 UCC § 9-203.
67
 "Attachment" was a word invented for the Code but "perfection," according to
Official Comment 1 to UCC § 9-301, is taken from section 60 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Act. The definitions I have given of the two words are, broadly speaking, correct, al-
though the attachment immediately gives right to some third parties and perfection gives
varying priority in certain cases.
58 A contract in writing is required for the sale of real property and in an installment
sale as we shall see below.
59 Articles 12 & 14 of the Sales Act. (Lag 10 juni 1905 om kop och byte av los
egendom).
12
CONDITIONAL SALES IN SWEDEN
because only contracts that damage creditors can be rescinded," if
the seller goes bankrupt, it follows that the buyer can also demand
specific performance. Thus it can be seen that after the contract is
concluded, the security agreement is valid between the seller and the
buyer and against third parties.
In spite of the general informality of Swedish contract law, there
are some prerequisites for the validity of the retention-of-ownership
clause in a conditional sale. The first is that this clause must be agreed
upon before the buyer takes possession of the goods.' This is thought
to be a consequence of the general rule in Swedish law that a pledge
for its validity requires possession by the secured party. It is also said
to follow from the principles underlying the Statute on Sales without
Transfer of Possession, which requires filing, announcement in church,
etc., to validate such an agreement. The basic policy for this rule is
illustrated in Unden's reason for recognizing the conditional sale as
opposed to pledge without possession: whereas the motive for the
conditional sales agreement is the need for a certain thing, the motives
for pledges without possession would be (if admitted) to postpone
bankruptcy as long as possible, or to satisfy some creditors at the
expense of others. If the retention-of-ownership agreement is made
after the sale, it is probably for the latter reason and this should not
be encouraged. However, there are some interesting comments on a
case where the retention of ownership was agreed upon after the sale
and where the buyer later sold the goods to a third party who knew
about the security agreement.62 The security agreement was held valid
between the parties "and as the corporation (the third party) con-
sequently had never had title to the machines in question but had only
acquired the right that . . . the buyer had," the security agreement was
deemed valid against the trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation.
The technical reason for this judgment is simple enough. In the typical
conditional sale the buyer does not get title to the goods until the
price is paid. If the buyer tries to give the seller security in the goods
after he has received the title this agreement is invalid against third
parties. But if, in the latter case, the buyer sells his rights to the
goods to somebody who knows about the security agreement, the rela-
tion between the second buyer and the original seller is the same as in
the typical conditional sale: buyer never had title and seller never lost
it. If this writer's proposal is adopted—i.e., that seller loses the title
at the transfer of possession—linden's argument can be used that if
the security agreement is recognized in this situation, little harm is
00 Chapter 2 of the Bankruptcy Section of the Code (Konkurslagen) ; Olivecrona,
Utsokning (Creditors' Rights) 19 (2d ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited as Olivecrona).
01
 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 147-49; linden, supra note 1, at 103. See also Nytt
Juridiskt Arkiv, Avdelning I, 755 (1932) (hereinafter cited as NJA).
62 NJA, supra note 61, at 80 (1923).
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done to the second buyer's creditors, because the motive is the second
buyer's need for a certain thing.
A second requirement for the validity of the conditional sale is
that the retention of ownership attaches to an individual thing." A
security agreement concerning a percentage of a carload of goods
would therefore be invalid. This is a problem touching upon the ques-
tion of commingling the goods, but here the commingling is done before
the delivery of the goods, thus the consideration behind the rule is
slightly different. The rule is regarded as a consequence of a general
idea that a right in rem must be attached to an individual thing." As
a rule subject to exceptions (certain of the Swedish statutes accept
the "floating lien," the object of much debate in American law)" it
remains open to further exception. But however subject to change, the
basic reason for the rule is the establishment of security and order in
legal life."
This is readily seen in the situation where the seller of a shipload
of wheat reserves his ownership in one-third of the wheat. In the
absence of the rule, serious problems of the buyer's rights to commingle
or sell would be open for determination. Stated more specifically, would
the buyer be obligated to retain the load intact or could he dispose of
two-thirds of it?
A further requirement in the formation of a conditional sale in
which Swedish law appears remiss is in the area of enforcement. Article
10 of the Installment Sales Act provides that there must be a written
contract signed by the purchaser, preserving the right of ownership
in the seller, giving the cash price and stating how much the buyer
has to pay and the dates when the installments are clue. Legal liability
is well defined. Such is not the case in Sweden. If the seller is to
have the benefit of the sheriff's assistance in the repossession of his
goods without having to obtain a. judgMent, certain formalities must
be added to the Installment Sales Act."
It becomes apparent then, that Swedish law has shown little con-
cern with the problems relating to how and when a security interest
springs into existence. On the contrary, legal thinking has been focused
on the various problems of invalidity: what happens when the goods
sold are, affixed to real .or personal property, are commingled or
processed, or are resold?
B. What Happens When Goods are Affixed to Real Property?
Section 9-313 of the UCC lays down a set of rules regulating
security interests in fixtures. The section begins with a clause leaving
53 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 149; Unden, supra note 1, at 102.
84 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 150.
65 Gilmore & Axelrod, supra note 39, at 533-40.
56 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 150.
67 See generally, chapter VII infra.
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to the state the determination of when goods become fixtures, but
deciding that what has been "incorporated into a structure in the man-
ner of lumber" etc., shall not be the collateral for a security interest
created under Article 9. The section thus creates two classes of fixtures
that make up a part of real property. It then goes on to give rules of
priorities largely depending upon when the security interest attaches,
concluding with subsection (5) which does away with the "material-
injury" test that created so much confusion under the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act."
The problem treated in UCC section 9-313 is one of the most
debated in the law of conditional sales in Sweden. Leading cases have
solved most of the problems, but certain troublesome areas remain.
Typical is Sweden's statute, enacted in 1895, on What is Part of Real
Property." It is an enumeration in six articles, beginning with "Real
property is land," later adding houses and things in houses ("fences,
rails, . .. doors, waterpipes, radiators," etc.) Swedish law does not
distinguish between two classes of the things that are realty as it exists
in American law both prior to" and under the UCC. On the contrary,
article 4 of the Swedish statute provides: "If anybody, according to
special statutory regulation or on other grounds valid against every-
body, has the ownership of a house or anything else that according to
previous articles should belong to another person's real property, it
shall not be deemed to belong to the real property." This article is
generally conceded to be poorly drafted, but the main problem has been
whether a retention of ownership in a conditional sale is a ground
"valid against everybody."
The problem was raised in a series of early cases," and the
principal question in those cases was: is a conditional sale of radiators
or elevators which are affixed to the buyer's real property valid against
the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy and against a subsequent purchaser
of the real property?
In the beginning it was suggested that the answer should depend
on whether there was material injury to the property, but after
some hesitation the Supreme Court did not agree. The leading case
came down in 1918. 72
 It dealt with a conditional sale of water and gas
pipes that had been built into the buyer's house. The house was sold
on execution auction and the buyers were notified of the conditional
sales contract. The Supreme Court confirmed the judgment of the
68
 Official Comment 5 to UCC 9-313. The test (in Section 7 of the UCSA) meant
that if repossession of the collateral would cause material injury to the real property to
which it was affixed, the reservation of ownership was void.
09
 Lag 24 maj 1895 ang. vad till fast egendom dr att hanfOra.
" Brown, The Law of Personal Property 698 n.1 (2d ed. 1955) (hereinafter cited as
Brown).
7 1
 NJA, supra note 61, at 278 (1909); 697 (1913); 263 (1914); 441 (1918); 602
(1923).
72 Id. at 441 (1918).
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trial court" which held that as the pipes had been made part of
the house, the retention of ownership in the contract could not be
valid against the subsequent purchaser. In a later case' involving
the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy, the Supreme Court took a similar
position, while invalidating the conditional sale. Considering that
the goods fell under the Statute of 1895, they held that the con-
ditional sale was not a ground valid against everybody according to
article 4. Therefore the goods were to be deemed to belong to the
house "whether they had been more or less inseparably attached to the
same," and that consequently the right to get the goods back, which
nevertheless might be had against the buyer, could not be valid against
his trustee in bankruptcy.
This case does away with the "material-injury" test and leaves
open the question of whether the conditional sale is valid between the
parties. The two cases come out clearly against the validity of the
security agreement against creditors and purchasers acquiring in-
terests in the realty, but the judgments are short and do not discuss
the reasons for and against such a rule. However, insight can be gained
from a reading of the legal literature. In the opinion of the writers, the
most important argument for the position taken by the Supreme Court
is that it was necessary to preserve the value and accessibility of real
estate mortgages." The banks would hesitate to give loans on such
security if parts of the realty {according to the statute of 1895) were
consistently under conditional sales. On the other hand, it has been
said that the principle behind the statute of 1895 was to have a precise
definition of what belongs to real property, to have order and certainty
in the field of realty, and that this principle would be violated if con-
ditional sales were allowed.70
 Another reason advanced was that the
tenants would be unduly damaged if the bathtub or radiator shOuld be
taken out, and so, it was argued that what is a working economic unit
should not be dispersed. Many of the things taken back would have
been specifically made for a house and would not fit well elsewhere."
Against the validity of these arguments is the contention that
such a rule would give the creditors of the houseowner an unearned
windfall. By putting in bathtubs, radiators, etc., the conditional seller
has added value to the real property which would be enjoyed by the
conditional vendee's creditors gratuitously. Of course, this is only true
as long as the sellers of what is to become fixtures continue to make
conditional sales, believing that their security interest will be recog-
73
 Generally speaking, Swedish Supreme Court cases are infinitely more succinct
than American ones, and often the Supreme Court just affirms the judgment of one of
the lower courts without writing a new opinion,
74 NJA, supra note 61, at 602 (1923).
75 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 172; Linden, supra note 1, at 104-05.
76 linden, supra note 1, at 105.
77 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 172-73.
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nized. Therefore, the ultimate argument against the adopted rule
would be the general need for purchase money security.
If the seller cannot make a conditional sale, how is he going to
secure payment for the goods? True, in the normal situation, the buyer
owns property, so the financing might be made with a mortgage,'
but if the house is already heavily mortgaged, the seller's (or other
financer's) mortgage will be the last satisfied from an ultimate execution
sale. Consequently, it is possible he might realize nothing from such
a sale. The other mortgagees will then have profited by the increase
in value caused by the goods sold and affixed.
If the mortgage financing in many instances is not practicable,
should the conditional sale be recognized to satisfy the need for pur-
chase money security? Perhaps not! It is true that construction
financing is a much-debated and unsolved problem in Swedish law."
It is also true that there is a great shortage of housing in Sweden to-
day. Although this might be argued as a reason for the nonavailability
of installment sales for construction material, it is probably more the
effect of the sweeping legislation on rents and credit-giving enacted in
Sweden, which keeps rents low (approximately one-third of the level
in the United States) and which tightly regulates the credit market.
Construction financing is a problem, but the conditional sale, for rea-
sons given, is not a feasible solution. Perhaps a change in the Swedish
legislation on mortgages would be a possible remedy.
If an American lawyer were faced with this situation, he would
probably attempt to validate the conditional sale of what is to become
a fixture by obtaining the consent of mortgagees and other creditors.
This solution has not been tried in Sweden and would probably not
be accepted by the courts for the reasons outlined above apart from
the argument that it would damage the mortgage security.
Although it appeared that the 1918" and 1923" cases resolved
the problems in this area, the subcontractors and suppliers of building
materials, by the device of a conditional sales contract providing
for arbitration in case of disagreement or default, attempted to reverse
the results of the decisions. Subsequently there were instances when the
buyer went bankrupt and the judgment of the arbitrators was that the
contractor had a right to repossess the goods. It wasn't until 1931" that
78
 Lagerstriim, Isagot om iigandrattsforbehfill till varmeledningar och liknandc tiltbe-
hhr till faslighet (Conditional Sales of Radiators and Similar Parts of Real Property)
SvJT, supra note 27, at 417, 426 (1932) (hereinafter cited as Lagerstriim).
78
 See Lundstedt, Byggnadsborgeniirernas riittsliga stallning i Sverige och utlandet
(The Legal Position of the Construction Creditors in Sweden and Abroad) (1917) and
Statens Offentliga Utredningar (the State's Public Investigations, abbreviated S013)
no. 26 (1927); no. 10 (1938); no. 62 (1946).
sll Supra, note 72.
81 Supra, note 74.
82 Id. at 647 (1931).
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such an arbitration award case involving a trustee in bankruptcy came
up. Fortunately, the Supreme Court adhered to its earlier convictions
and invalidated the conditional sales contract since the goods had been
installed in the realty. The suppliers had relied on the "validity of an
arbitration agreement against a trustee in bankruptcy" under a leading
1913 case" which the court distinguished on its facts. They reasoned
that in 1913, the question was the size of a certain debt, whereas here,
the issue is the actual validity of a claim against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy.
The import of the 1918 and 1923 decisions in summary form
then, is that the security agreement, is not valid against subsequent
purchasers of realty, with or without notice. Nor is it valid against
creditors, which means that even if the seller has a judgment to re-
possess the goods, it could not be executed if a creditor seized the
property before, or if the buyer went bankrupt." This also pertains
to arbitration decisions to repossess if the buyer suffers bankruptcy,
for an arbitration decision cannot be valid where a judgment by a
court would not be valid."
Apart from the above, the 1923 case should be considered further
since the language of that case infers that the seller might still have
some rights against the buyer. This supposition raises two very
_interesting questions. If the buyer defaults and agrees to repossession,
does the seller have a right to enter and repossess? Secondly, does the
seller have a right to a judgment and execution as long as the real prop-
erty is in the buyer's possession and before creditors have closed in?
As to these two questions an argument has been made" that as the
owner of realty can sell parts of his property to be severed from the
rest, he should also be allowed to contract so that parts can be taken
away from him, if he fails to pay for them.
The question becomes more complicated if the interests of tenants
are introduced into the picture. Clearly, the tenant has a right to
damages if, for example, the landlord sells the bathtub or, in the alter-
native, the tenant could buy a new bathtub and sue the landlord for
the price" (since he probably cannot stop the sale). These rules are
supported in the statutes on execution and bankruptcy preserving the
rights of tenants," and prohibiting the splitting of real property."
83 Supra note 61, at 191 (1913).
84 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 173.
85 Id. at 182.
88 LagerstrOm, supra note 78, at 418.
87 See generally, Statute on Landlord and Tenant, ch. 3, Arts. 11, 15, 16 (Lag 14
juni 1907 on nyttjanderatt till fast egendom).
88 Articles 107 and 133 of the Section on Creditors' Rights of the Code (Utsiikning-
slagen) to which Article 70 of the Section on Bankruptcy of the Code refers.
80 Article 78 of the Section on Creditors' Rights of the Code to which Article 70
of the Section on Bankruptcy of the Code refers.
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Under the present law which prevents the sheriff from executing
such an agreement or judgment, it would seem that the seller should
not be allowed to take goods back even when in agreement with the
owner of the house. The principles underlying the cited statutory
provisions appear to be in opposition to such repossession. Reference
is made to the principles that an execution should not violate the
rights of third parties and that the law should not permit splitting of
valuable economic units."
The previous discussion has concerned cases where the buyer
of the goods was the owner of the real property. The problem where
he is a tenant first reached the Supreme Court in 1933." A company
sold an oven under a conditional sale to a tenant-baker. The oven
was installed bringing into play, the Statute of 1895. The baker left
the house without paying for the oven and shortly thereafter the
company sued the baker and the landlord for the price or repossession
of the oven. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment
reasoning that as the installation of the oven had been caused by the
tenant and in her interest, as the oven could be separated from the
real property without material injury to the same and as the suit had
been brought shortly after the tenant had moved, the security agree-
ment was valid.
The court did not have to strain to reach this result because
Article 4 of the Statute of 1895 was devised, among other things, to
exempt items that have been inserted by a tenant. Since the tenant can
exercise rights of ownership over this part of the real property, no
reason can be advanced for restricting the seller's retention of owner-
ship, conditioned, of course, by the holding in the "baker" case. 02
Whether the rule that a tenant can have separate ownership of a part
of a house is a sound one is a problem beyond the scope of this article.
C. What Happens if the Goods are Attached to Personal Property
or are Commingled or Processed?
Sections 9-314 and 9-315 of the UCC cover the security interests
when the collateral is attached to personal property. or is commingled
or processed. In all such cases the security interest is deemed valid
against third parties in opposition to prior law in many states. In
Sweden when the security interest is deemed valid, and the collateral
is commingled or processed, the major problem presented is the re-
possession. What and how much should the seller be alloWed to re-
possess when the goods have lost their identity?
The Swedish approach has been to discuss the problem of attach-
Do Schmidt, supra note 2, at 177-78.
01 NJA, supra note 61, at 447 (1933).
02 Ibid.
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ment first. The commingling or processing of the goods is then regarded
as a "worse" kind of attachment to personal property. This is based
on a belief that when collateral attaches to personal property, the
security agreement is invalidated. Therefore, commingling and proc-
essing, where the collateral completely loses its identity, would produce
the same effect.
Of the five Swedish cases dealing with attachment, four have
involved conditional sales of machines that have been installed in
marine vessels. In this context it should be mentioned that Sweden
has a statute regulating mortgages on vessels" which provides for
possible security in vessels of over three tons by filing.
The problem first came up in 1925," concerning a conditional
sale of a machine installed in a small boat. When the shipowner's
creditors seized the boat for payment of his debt, the conditional
seller protested against the seizure of the machine alleging his reten-
tion of ownership. The trial court found for the seller on the ground
that the attachment of the machine to the ship did not cause the
invalidation of the ownership of the seller. The appellate court
affirmed on this rather tenuous ground which in legal reality is no
ground at all; it is merely stating the rule one has adopted without
giving reasons."
The second case was a 1934 decision," in which the pattern was
the sathe. There was a sale, installation and seizure of the vessel
containing the equipment. However, the results were quite different.
The Supreme Court found that the installation of the machine had
invalidated the security agreement, because repossession would neces-
sitate considerable work and would cause material injury to the craft.
In 1935" the owners of a power fishing boat had gone bankrupt
and the seller sought to repossess the motor from the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. It was proven that the motor could be removed at negligible
cost and without any damage to the ship. The Supreme Court denied
repossession on the ground that if it was allowed, the ship would es-
sentially lose its fitness for use as a fishing boat.
The fourth case came down during the war, in .1942." It con-
cerned the conditional sale of an auxiliary motor which was attached
to a boat originally built as a sailboat. The motor could be taken
away without injury to the boat simply by loosening some nuts. Dur-
ing the previous war years, because of the fuel shortage, the motor,
although installed, had not been used. The case came up as a protest
On Lag 10 maj 1901 om inteckning i fartyg.
84 SvJT, supra note 27, 58 (case) (1925).
85 A very common habit with Swedish courts, unfortunately,
90 NJA, supra note 61, at 234 (1934).
97 Id. at 416 (1935).
98 Id. at 195 (1942).
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against the seizure of the boat and motor to satisfy the creditors of
the owner. The Supreme Court denied repossession "as the motor .
by the installation must be regarded as having been so attached to .
[the ship] that the retention of ownership could not be claimed at the
seizure." This again is no reason at all.
The most recent case occurred in 1960" and involved a collision
of two conditional sales. On March 10, 1956, the buyer bought a car
under a conditional sale. On March 18, he bought two tires from
another seller under a conditional sale and put them on the car. On
October 30, the buyer allowed repossession of the car as he could not
pay. It was resold by the seller on April 23, 1957. The car dealer knew
about the conditional sale of the tires when he repossessed the car.
The seller of the tires then brought an action against the car dealer
for payment of the tires which the dealer knew belonged to the tire
vendor. The car dealer claimed that the retention of ownership in the
tires ceased when they were put on the car. The Supreme Court found
for the car dealer "as the tires . . . must be regarded as having become
parts of or accesories to the car in such a way that, . . . [the tire
vendor] cannot, on the basis of the retention of ownership, claim a
right to the tires valid against everybody." In a concurring opinion, 100
Justice Karlgren, 101 explained his stand on the issue by stating that
the law should not permit value destruction. Therefore, when the
repossession of the goods involves considerable cost or material injury
to that which it is attached, the seller's reserved title must be regarded
as void. However, there is more reason for hesitation when the goods
attached are things that are easily exchangeable such as tires. It is
true that a car without tires is unusable, but it is not valueless. A buyer
simply calculates what it must cost to buy tires and bids accordingly.
Nevertheless, Justice Karlgren concludes, a certain value destruction
occurs even in such a case. Especially if other parts of the car are
also sold under conditional sale, the execution sale might be of a
skeleton of a car and the purchasing price a nominal one. The law
should try to preserve economic units in spite of the fact that the
exchangeability of tires might justify a special rule since it is not
shown that conditional sales of this item are so common to require
such a rule.
In each of three Supreme Court cases dealing with boat motors
the Court appears to abandon its position taken in the preceding
99 Id. at 9 (1960).
100 The voting system in the Swedish Supreme Court is, at least in some respects,
a mystery. "Concurring opinion" here means that Mr. Justice Karigren first concurs in
the majority opinion (i.e., both in the reason and in the result) and thereafter writes
his own opinion (the concurring opinion), usually a much longer and more specific one
to explain exactly what he meant by the majority opinion.
101 Probably the most well known and prominent of the present Swedish Supreme
Court justices.
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case. The initial case seemed predicated on a material injury test.
When the next case arose, involving no material injury, the Court
shifted to what could be called a fitness for purpose test. Then in 1942,
the boat without the motor was still fit for fishing and so the Court
neglects the use of any test whatsoever. The only safe assumption that
one could possibly derive from this line of cases is that once the motor
is in the boat the security is gone. Considering this along with the
tire case and Justice Karlgren's opinion, we would have a crystallized
rule of law: a retention of ownership to an accessory loses its validity as
soon as it is attached to the main object however easy it is to take away.
Possibly, an exception might be made for things that are not at all
necessary for the functioning of the main object. Take, for example,
a car radio. It can easily be taken away and the car loses very little
in value.'
Two problems remain. The first is whether the conditional sale
should be deemed valid between the parties when some thing has
been attached to personal property. This is the kind of legal problem
that seldom comes into court. If the seller wants to repossess the motor
in a car and the buyer refuses to allow the separation and no other
creditors meddle in the affair, it is easier and cheaper for the seller to
get a judgment against the buyer for the debt and seize the whole car
and sell it. From the above mentioned series of judgments the probable
implication would be that the conditional sale is also invalid as between
the parties. However, this should not be stated as the "existing rule"
since the cases do not make it obvious that it will be followed.
The remaining problem is what to do when none of the goods that
are assembled can be regarded as the main product, e.g., the situation
of a car dealer who buys the motor from one manufacturer, the chassis
from another and the body from a third, all under conditional sales."
Schmidt has proposed joint ownership of the car for the three sellers.
If this rule means that they would not be allowed to separate the parts
but at default should repossess it jointly and sell it and divide the
proceeds, this is a good rule and in line with the trend of the Supreme
Court judgments. But the question is not a practical one and therefore
very difficult to discuss.
A noteworthy corollary to the above is the situation where goods are
commingled but .where nobody owns a major part of the goods. Here,
certainly, joint ownership to the goods as proposed by Schmidt could
be utilized. For an apt illustration, consider the 1959 casel" which
involved the sale of pigs for breeding and slaughtering, sold under
three conditional sales' contracts. The sellers sold 240, 38 and 44 pigs
respectively. Later the buyer's financial position became wobbly, so
102 At least in Sweden, where car radios are not (yet) standard.
103 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 192-93.
104 NJA, supra note 61, at 590 (1959).
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he contracted with the three sellers to take back jointly 206 pigs and
sell them to satisfy their claims, remitting any balance. Shortly there-
after, the buyer went bankrupt. The trustee sought return of the
money, alleging that the retention of ownership was void on two counts:
(1) the buyer was allowed to sell the pigs before payment and (2)
the pigs had been so commingled that each sellers' pigs could not be
distinguished. The first count was not regarded as proven: As to the
second the Supreme Court simply stated that because the pigs were
delivered by the seller to the buyer and commingled, this does not have
the effect of transferring title to the buyer. This must be taken to
mean that the sellers have joint ownership of the pigs.
The accepted Swedish rules therefore tend to restrict considerably
the area in which the conditional sale can effectively exist. As will be
discussed later, the seller even loses his right against a bona fide
purchaser of the goods from the buyer. This means that in cases where
it is likely that the goods will be affixed, attached, commingled,
processed or sold, the conditional sale is impracticable as a security
transaction. Its use is restricted to situations involving a sale . to the
ultimate user of goods that in themselves constitute an economic unit,
and are not to disappear in ultimate use (as is the case with fuel, food,
cigarettes, etc.). The field will then be the one typically occupied by
installment sales. Yet, it should be clear that purchase money security
is needed in other cases, which is the strong stand of the UCC. As
the seller of the boat motor contended in the 1935 105
 case, his
customers—mainly fishermen—often badly needed credit which the
seller could only give against security in the goods sold. However,
the arguments against the validity of this conditional sale are likewise
quite convincing.
The situation is such that if security for purchase money credit
is needed, it must be given by legislating another type of security
device.'" Of course, if Sweden had a similar opportunity to make new
law as was enjoyed by the draftsmen of the UCC, the conditional sale
could be made to work, the militating factors eliminated and the cur-
rent needs adequately met.
D. , The Validity of the Security Clause in a Conditional Sale,
Where the Buyer is Allowed to Commingle, Process or Sell the Goods
In section 9-205 the UCC makes a break with prior law by
expressly validating security agreements even if the debtor has the right
to use, commingle or otherwise deal with the goods. This was a
deliberate break with previous doctrine clearly expressed by Mr.
105 Supra note. 43.
1" There are other security devices but they are restricted to certain categories of
debtors. See Chapter IV infra.
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Justice Brandeis in Benedict v. Ratner' where he said that when the
debtor has the unfettered dominion over the collateral, the transaction
is void. The UCC reasons that it is for the businessman to decide,
upon business judgments, how much dominion can be safely left to
the debtor and that the legal validity of the lien should not hinge on
this consideration.'"
As for conditional sales, the Swedish rule is that when the agree-
ment allows the buyer to commingle goods with other goods or to process
or resell them, the retention of ownership in the seller is void.'"
Almen's explanation of the rule is that the retention-of-ownership
clause in these cases was "not seriously meant." His only critic was
Schmidt, who argued for the rule on the ground that it is practical and
just. According to Schmidt, if another rule existed and a dealer became
bankrupt, it would be a mere coincidence if the goods of seller A rather
than those of seller B remain in the debtor's possession; consequently,
some arbitrarily lucky creditors have security in what the debtor
possesses and the rest of the creditors remain without payment."°
Under a sale on commission, the commission merchant sells goods
in his own name that are the property of his principal. Here the
principal's ownership is recognized until the goods are sold. There is,
therefore, a need to have some grounds on which to decide whether a
merchant holds goods for sale on commission or as the buyer in a
conditional sale, and cases have actually turned on whether the
label "commission" was accepted by the court. Whether a court will
find a commission"' situation will depend upon whether: (1) the com-
mission merchant is under a duty to keep the commission goods separated
and also to keep incoming payments separate; (2) the principal sets
the price; (3) the commission merchant gets his salary as a provision
on goods sold; (4) he has a right to return unsold goods; (5) he is
under a duty to account regularly to the principal.
Where the right to dispose of the goods has been proven the cases
have denied the validity of the security agreement. In two such cases 112
the parties had termed their relation "commission" and the Supreme
Court found that it was actually a sale and, since the buyer was
permitted to sell, the security agreement was void. In another case, the
German corporation Krupp sold some threshing machines to a Swedish
company which was to sell them and pay Krupp out of the purchase
money. Krupp also reserved security in the proceeds, which indicated
"7 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
108 Official Comments to UCC § 9-205, especially Comment 5; Spivack, supra note
35, at 9-15.
109 Almen, supra note 1, at 408; FOrslag, supra note 10, at 179-80; Schmidt, supra
note 2, at 195-96, Unden, supra note 1, at 103-06.
I" Schmidt, supra note 2, at 204-05.
lit Id. at 206.
112 NJA, supra note 61, at 449 (1908); 591 (1937).
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that the contract was drafted according to German law, since such
security is not allowed in Swedish conditional sales but is common in
German conditional sales. 113
 Krupp's retention of ownership was
deemed void as against the company's trustee in bankruptcy because
the company previously had a right to resell the machines. A 1960
case"' dealt with doors that were to be affixed to real property. The
Supreme Court regarded it as evident from the circumstances that the
contractor was entitled to affix the doors before he had paid for them.
Under such conditions the retention of ownership is void.
To properly evaluate this consistent dichotomy running between
the Swedish view and that of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
reasoning behind the Benedict v. Ratner ruling and UCC opposition
to it must be determined. Mr. Justice Brandeis' rationale in the
Benedict case is one of conceptual contradiction more than of practical
consideration. He denies that his ruling rests upon ostensible owner-
ship; states that the rule he is following "implies fraud conclusively
because of the reservation of dominion inconsistent with the effective
disposition of title and creation of a lien.'" It seems that he is
saying—especially in the light of what follows—that the conceptual
nature of mortgages and other liens is inconsistent with the debtor's
unrestricted dominion over the collateral. If this interpretation is
correct, it is no wonder that the UCC with its functional approach
opposes such reasoning. The main concern of the UCC seems to have
been to validate the floating lien,'" which heretofore had been hindered
by the Benedict rule. Under Swedish law there have long existed
security devices which permitted a floating lien. The reason for the
Swedish rule is not one of conceptual inconsistency—at least not
exclusively—as is shown by Schmidt. While section 9-205 concerns
security transactions in general, the Swedish rule separates conditional
sales, and holds that once the goods have been affixed, attached, com-
mingled or sold, the security interest of the original seller is gone.
E Swedish Combination and American Future Advances and After-
Acquired Property
In Sweden it was formerly very common for an installment sales
contract to carry a clause that the seller retained the ownership of the
goods until the buyer had paid the full debt. This clause was often used
when the buyer wanted to buy new things before he had made the last
payment on prior purchases. The seller then had security for the
purchase money in the latter sale, not only in the goods in that sale, but
also in the goods first sold. Since he generally used exactly the same
113 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 64.
NJA, supra note 61, at 21 (1960).
115 Benedict v. Ratner, supra note 52, at 363.
110 Official Comment 1 to UCC § 9-205.
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printed contract in both cases, it is also true that the goods sold last
were security for the purchase money in the first sale. This was called a
combination of sales. The number of sales in the combination was
unlimited. The clause in the contract was also used to secure such
obligations as payment of repair costs when a car was sold and the
buyer, before the last payment was made, had the car repaired at the
seller's shop. Even debts totally unconnected with sales or the goods
sold were covered by the clause.
In American terminology this would be a question of after-
acquired property and future advances. In general, UCC section 9-204
regards as valid a security agreement which purports to cover property
that is to be acquired after the agreement and to secure advances that
are to be made. However, there is a time limitation on after-acquired
crops or consumer goods."'
In Sweden a conditional sale that purports to cover future
advances whether in the form of combinations or otherwise has long
been deemed valid. The draftsmen's comment to the Installment Sales
Act of 1915 stated that they probably were valid both between the
parties and against creditors.18 Schmidt recognizes their validity
although he is critical and believes the rule should be altered. 118
 His
attack." on combinations and other forms of future advances is
based on the same reasoning that fostered the reluctance of American
courts to accept the floating charge )121 i.e., a buyer could by this device
withdraw practically all his assets from his unsecured creditors.
Schmidt adds that the buyer's social dependence on one seller becomes
more pressing than under a usual installment sale.
One of the uncertainties in Swedish law was whether a combina-
tion would be valid if the first conditional sale did not carry a combina-
tion clause even though the parties might agree at the time of the
second conditional sale that a combination should be made. Two
Supreme Court cases' which endorsed the future advance and the
combination shed no light on the problem since they both contained
future advance clauses. However, it is interesting to note the vigorous
dissent in the earlier of the two cases' by the prominent Justice
Alexanderson. He reasoned that the law recognizes the validity of a
conditional sale because it secures the normal winding up of a credit
sale. Thus the combination is a misuse of the conditional sale and
should not be allowed.
In the 1953 changes of the Installment Sales Act, the combination
117 UCC § 9-204(4)(a) & (b).
118 Fifirslag, supra note 10,. at 201-02.
lio Schmidt, supra note 2, at 154-60.
120 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 158-59.
121
 Official Comment 3 to UCC § 9-205.
122 NJA, supra note 61, at 184 (1944); 152 (1948).
123 Id. at 184, 189-91 (1944).
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was prohibited. According to the act, the security agreement could not
cover more than the purchase price and related costs. If it purported to
cover future advances, it was void. An exception was made for repairs
and a seller might still repair the goods sold with security in the goods
for the cost. The reason given for the change was that a combination
clause in the contract was often overlooked by the buyer. When the
buyer later wanted to buy new goods the seller could offer them
without down payment (for the seller already had security) and thus
compete effectively even if his goods actually were not as good as
those of his competitors.'"
The exception for repairs in the Installment Sales Act was that it
had been shown at interviews with representatives of car dealers, car
owners and buyers that this was a desirable security device. This was
especially true for small truck-owners since it enabled them to get
truck repairs on credit without having to leave the car in the possession
of the repair shop until the cost was paid. Under the present law they
can get secured credit from the seller.'" However, these reasons were
attacked by the Legislative Council, which said that the arguments for
the general prohibition against combination were valid even here.
As for the buyer's need for repairs on credit, it was probable that such
credit would be given anyway, because if the buyer used the car to
earn his living, the seller would be interested in letting him keep the
car so that he could pay for the repairs.""
It seems to this writer that the prohibition of combinations and
other kinds of future advances in conditional sales is sound. The
conditional sale is an effective way of securing purchase money credit .
and while other kinds of non-possessory financing might be needed,
they should be created by legislation. Problems such as the need for
filing when debts other than purchase money are secured should be
discussed. Consequently, the exception for repairs in the Installment
Sales Act was regrettable. It would be better if the rule was universal,
i.e., conditional sales can never secure anything but the purchase
money and related costs.
III. THE RIGHTS TO SUBSTITUTES FOR AND TO PROFITS, OFFSPRING
AND OTHER INCREMENTS RECEIVED FROM THE COLLATERAL
The problem of substitutes for the collateral is treated in the UCC
under section 9-306. Although the statute is extremely comprehensive,
no specific mention is made of expropriation and insurance money in
either text or comments. However, the language in subsection (1)
"when collateral . . . is . . . otherwise disposed of" would seem to
124 Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv. Audelning II 259, 295 (1953) (hereinafter cited as NJA
II) (Draftsmen's Comments to the Amendments of 1953 to the Installment Sales Act).
125 Supra note 124, at 296-97.
120 id. at 303-04.
27
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
warrant their inclusion. Therefore, without reciting the enumerated
provisions as to filing, perfecting the security interest, etc., the basic
import of the section is that a security interest in such proceeds is valid.
In Swedish law this is a difficult problem because virtually nothing
has been written on the subject and there have been only three cases
decided in this area. Two 127
 are war-time cases concerning cars that
had been taken by the Swedish state for military purposes under a
requisition statute. In both cases the cars were sold under a conditional
sale. The buyer submitted them to a Requisition Commission, which
issued a promissory note for a sum determined by the Commission to be
paid by the Swedish State Bank. The notes were not payable immediately
as the Swedish government did not want to release too much purchasing
power at a time when the supply of goods was restricted. Since sixty per
cent of the cars were sold under conditional sales, the bank was required
to investigate before paying the notes in order to ascertain the correct
creditor. If this could not be determined the bank was to pay the
governor128 according to the Statute of 1927 on the Payment of Debts
by the Deposit of Money in Public Custody.'
In the first of these two cases a conditional buyer of a truck sub-
mitted the truck to the Requisition Commission before having paid
the last payment. When he was about to receive the promissory note
from the State Bank, the sheriff intervened and seized the note in
satisfaction of an executory judgment in favor of still another creditor.
The buyer protested, claiming that he owed the money to the condi-
tional seller, but to no avail. The conditional seller's protest proved
more successful and the Supreme Court reversed the seizure to the
extent of the remaining debt on the purchase price. The Court reasoned
that since the note was made to the buyer but delivered to the sheriff by
the chairman, there could be no actual payment received by the buyer
from the state.
The second case was even more complicated. The buyer submitted
a bus to the commission and received his note. However, he still owed
the seller a substantial part of the purchase money. He took the note
to a private bank (as he could not get money on it immediately) and
sold part of his interest in the note. This transfer was authorized by
the Swedish State Bank. Shortly afterwards the buyer defaulted on
his payment for the bus, and the seller obtained a judgment against
him. The sheriff seized the buyer's claim on the state bank. The
private bank, which had bought part of that claim, protested, alleging
that its property had been seized. The Supreme Court decided that
127 NJA, supra note 61, at 711 (I & II) (1941).
128 Appointed by the central government and similar to the prefet in France.
Sweden does not have the federal system.
120 (Lag 24 mars 1927 on ads betalning genom pennigars nedsattande i allmant
fiirvar). This statute serves the same function as the Anglo-American interpleader.
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since payment for the bus had been made by the State Bank to the
buyer, the fact that payment out of that account was barred for some
time did not per se deprive him of the ability to transfer part of his
right to the account. Further, the buyer was obligated to pay the
seller the remainder of the purchase price out of that account; con-
sequently, he had only the right to dispose of the account to the extent
that it exceeded the debt. The Court was of the opinion that since the
private bank, at the time of transfer, had reason to believe that the bus
was bought under a conditional sale and had failed to investigate the
possibility of an outstanding debt, they could not have a valid claim
to the extent of this debt.
The third case"° involved a conditional sale of a horse. The buyer,
realizing that he could not pay, arranged to have the price paid by a
third person who thereby acquired the seller's rights to the horse.
Shortly thereafter something happened to the horse and the buyer
was awarded an account receivable from the insurance company which
was seized by the sheriff to satisfy the buyer's debt to another creditor.
The third party immediately brought suit. The appellate court held for
the third party on the grounds that it was proven that he had acquired
the seller's right to the horse and therefore had the right before the
buyer's creditor to collect the insurance.
All three cases present peculiarities which make conclusions
difficult, although it is significant that all three cases deal with
proceeds that are separate and identifiable. It is beyond doubt that
Swedish law does not extend to the seller any security rights to the
proceeds in the simple case where the goods are sold and the money
commingled with the buyer's general assets. If this be considered the
general rule, then the cases should be looked upon as exceptions to
this rule founded on the principle that a conditional sale must concern
an individual thing, not priority up to a certain value in the assets of
the debtor-buyer. The first case escapes the general rule by pointing
out that payment in full has not been made. Probably, an analogy
was drawn with the Statute on Expropriation,i 3' which had elaborate
rules determining how the different interests in expropriated property
should be satisfied. 132
 The second case probably held for the seller not
on any rules of rights in rem (he was not termed the owner of the
money) but because of the buyer's obligation to pay coupled with the
bank's failure to investigate. This is an interpretation suggested by
Karlgren133 and seems to be in 'agreement with the terminology used.
13° SvJT, supra note 27, at 51 (case) (1949).
131 Karlgren, Svensk rattspraxis. Sakratt. 1940-42 (Swedish Cases. Rights in Rem.
1940-42) SvJT, supra note 27, at 400-01 (1944) (hereinafter cited as Karlgren) 401.
332
 Articles 22 & 31 of the Statute of 1917 on Expropriation (Lag om expropriation
12 maj 1917).
133
 Karlgren, supra note 131, at 401. (Mr. Karlgren was appointed to the Supreme
Court in 1946).
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However, it is difficult to see how the buyer should be obliged to pay
the seller out of the account in the state bank, if the seller has no right
to this account. A debtor has the right to pay his creditors out of any
assets. The third case was decided taking into account the Statute on
Insurance Contracts,'" article 54 of which says that when goods are
insured and no special interest is designated as the object of the in-
surance, it is deemed to insure the interests of anybody who, being the
owner, pledgee, etc., has an interest in seeing that the goods are not
destroyed. As the insurance had not been collected, the decision
simply regarded article 54 as also covering a case of conditional sale
where the seller's interest had been transferred.
The above would indicate that existing Swedish law is represented
by the following rules: Basically the seller in a conditional sale has no
right to proceeds. Exceptions can be made when insured events occur
or when expropriations or similar actions are taken by the state, if the
money has not yet been paid to the buyer. It is improbable that a
Swedish court would recognize a security interest in proceeds that the
buyer has received even if the money collected were held in a separate
bank account or the like. However, if these are the rules, they seem
contradictory. The general principle that a conditional sale should create
a security interest . in an individual thing is sound. A security interest
should not be allowed to cover non-identifiable proceeds. On the other
hand, if the Supreme Court deemed it equitable to recognize the seller's
security interest in proceeds when the state has taken the goods by
expropriation or requisition, it would seem to follow that equity should
give the seller rights in all proceeds when they are clearly identifiable.
If, for example, the price is not yet paid to the buyer, or if the buyer
holds a draft or a check, there would appear to be no reason to refuse
recognition of the seller's right to the proceeds.
The rights of the seller to the offspring of animals sold or similar
yield of goods are not dealt with directly or specifically in the UCC.
Probably, the applicable section is 9-204 on attachment of the security
interest to after-acquired property, although this presupposes that
there is an after-acquired property clause in the security agreement.
The Swedish Sales Act, article 18, provides that yield form the goods
sold is the property of the seller if it falls before the appointed date of
delivery; otherwise it belongs to the buyer.'" This article likewise does
not apply to the immediate question, as it presupposes a regular sale
where the goods have not been taken back for default. If there is no
default, the rule applies even to a conditional sale, and there can be
no question that the yield is covered by the seller's security interest.
The issue is whether or not the yield serves as security when the
134 Lag 8 april 1927 om fOrsillcringsavtal.
135 With the exception that if the yield could reasonably have been expected to fall
at another time it shall be deemed as having fallen at that time.
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contract is silent, and even if the contract covers this, will the courts
recognize the intent of the parties?
In commenting on the rescission article in the Sales Act, Almenlan
seems to think that in case there is no agreement the seller has a right
in the yield; possibly the buyer and his creditors have a right to com-
pensation for storage of and work in procuring the yield. It has been
suggested that this statement should be applied to a default situation
in a conditional sale. Schmidt' 37
 does not give any rule for the case
where there is no agreement, but thinks that there should be some
limit to the validity of an agreement if the yield occurs a long time
after the sale. This is because of the difficulties in securing evidence as
to the quantity and value of the yield.
Two cases have been reported on this question, both dealing with
the offspring of animals. In the first case 138 the conditional sale took
place at a horse and cow auction. When the buyer went bankrupt
the seller repossessed and sold the anmials and their offspring. The
trustee in bankruptcy sued the seller for the value of the offspring. The
Supreme Court held for the seller because the sale had been rescinded,
and the trustee had not alleged circumstances giving him any right to
the offspring, nor had the trustee demanded any compensation for their
breeding. This is clearly built upon Almen's view and equates default
in a conditional sale with the rescission for a breach of warranty in
an ordinary sale. It should be noted that the Installment Sales Act
did not apply in this case. If the act had been applicable, it would of
course be error to give the buyer compensation for custody or breeding,
because in dealing with the settlement of the parties' rights at reposses-
sion it excludes other compensation. In cases outside the act, however,
Almen's view seems reasonable.
The second case 139
 involved a seizure for a debt of 15 hogs. The
conditional seller of the ancestors of the hogs protested against the
seizure. The appellate court dismissed the protest on the ground that
"even if at the sale ... it had been convened that the retention of
ownership should concern also the offspring fallen after the sale, such a
retention of ownership cannot be alleged in this case where the offspring
in question has fallen a considerable time after the sale" (for thirteen
of the hogs the time elapsed was one and a half years). This seems to
mirror Schmidt's view rather closely.
In principle then, the security agreement in Sweden covers yield.
At a certain time after the transfer of possession, however, the yield
is no longer security. It seems that both rules are applied regardless of
what the parties have agreed to (unless they have agreed that the yield
130 Alnthi, supra note 1, at 758.
137 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 151-53.
138 NJA, supra note 61, at 33 (1935).
130 SvJT, supra note 27, at 79 (case) (1961).
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is not covered by the security agreement; however, this alternative is
less likely to occur, as we are here dealing with a strong seller-weak
buyer situation). Nevertheless, there are many such questions con-
cerning rent for the goods earned before, but due after the sale, or milk
and other current yield of sold cattle left unanswered as no cases have
been reported.
IV. RIGHTS OF UNSECURED CREDITORS
When stated above that a conditional sale is "valid" or is "recog-
nized," this has simply been another way of saying that the seller
has a security in the goods prior to the unsecured creditors of the
buyer. The major problems in this area deal with the seller's rights
when the unsecured creditors of the buyer seize his property or force
him into bankruptcy and with the buyer's right when the seller is
insolvent, although this is a less frequent and less complicated case.
Often, when a person is insolvent, his only non-exempt assets are those
goods sold under a conditional sale and for which payment in full has
not been made. If the value of these goods is higher than what is left for
the buyer-debtor to pay, the right to acquire the goods is a valuable
asset.
The simplest solution to the "seizure" situation is for the creditor
or the trustee in bankruptcy to pay the remainder of the purchase
price to the seller and then auction off the goods in the usual way. All
writers' agree that the seller cannot refuse to take an early payment
in this case, the argument being that the seller's credit to the buyer is
not really an investment' and that furthermore, the interest is
often hidden in the price. A variation of this is to put the goods up for
sale on an execution auction fixing the lowest bid equal to the buyer's
remaining debt plus the costs of the auction. These are the most
expedient and commonly used solutions. However, available alter-
natives without seller consent have been the subject of wide specula-
tion. Since the buyer has a right to the goods after payment of the
purchase price, most writers agree that this right is a proper subject of
sale provided the possession of the goods or the obligation to,pay is not
transferred. Clearly, this is very impractical, but theoretically it is a
possible solution.' 42 It would be better to sell the totality of the buyer's
rights and duties under the contract, but this would require the permis-
sion of the seller. 143
14 ° Eilard, Exekutionsrattsliga uppsatser (Essays on Creditors' Rights) 36 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as Eilard); Eklund & Nordstrom, Lagen om avbetalningsktip (the
Installment Sales Act) art. 1 comment 14 (1953) (hereinafter cited as Eklund & Nord-
striim) ; af Hillstrom, AvbetalningskOpet (the Installment Sale) SvJT, supra note 27, at
670, 676-77 (1941) (hereinafter cited as af HallstrOm); Und6n, supra note 1, at 106; see
also NJA, supra note 61, at 195 (1952).
111 of Hillstrom, supra note 140, at 676-77.
142 Eklund & Nordstrom, supra note 140, art. 1 comment 14.
143 Und6n, supra note 1, at 106.
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As early as 1924 144 the Supreme Court recognized the buyer's right
to the goods as against the seller's creditors, rejecting the argument of
the seller's trustee in bankruptcy that because the seller had reserved
the title, the creditors were entitled to the total value of the goods. As
a result, the preservation of the buyer's right poses little practical
difficulty: He remains in possession and pays his debt as it becomes due
and the creditors must either wait for or assign this "account receiv-
able" to a bank.
V. RIGHTS OF SECURED CREDITORS TO THE GOODS
Section 9-312 of the UCC and sections referred to therein, outline
rules on priorities among conflicting security interests in the same
collateral. A detailed comparison between American and Swedish law
on this point would exceed available space and will not be undertaken.
However, it should be noted that section 9-312 refers to and contains
rules formerly covered by the law on conditional sales. Special rules
apply to purchase money security interests which in their turn , are
classified according to the kind of collateral involved in the agreement
(crops, inventory, collateral other than inventory). It should also be
remembered that the term "purchase money security interest" covers
not only conditional sales but also other devices such as chattel
mortgages and trust receipts. As a matter of fact, the UCC makes
perhaps the most important break with earlier American law through
its functional approach to the difficult questions of priority in section
9-312.
Swedish security devices can be divided along the same lines as
those used in Article 9, i.e., consensual security interests and others.
The difference in groupings is that the consensual security interests
are created by legal actions, the sole purpose and effect of which is to
secure an obligation, whereas common law and statutory liens and
their corollaries in Swedish law are but side effects (and purposes) of
legal actions, the main effect of which is something else (renting an
apartment, repairing a car, etc.).
A. Consensual Security Interests
Historically, and theoretically, the basic consensual security
interest in Sweden is the pledge. The rules do not differ too much from
those in Anglo-American law; possession is required for validity, risk
of loss is on the pledgor, and the pledgee has a right to sell the pledge
if the pledgor does not pay.
A later security device was created in 1845 by the Statute on Sale
of Goods which are to Remain in the Seller's Possession (referred to
as the Statute on Sale without Transfer of Possession). It is important,
not so much because of its practical significance, but because it has
144 NJA, supra note 61, at 588 (1924).
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always served as the basis for discussion of Swedish security law,
especially on the problem of possession. It is a statutory expression of
the general unwillingness to recognize non-possessory liens. Most
transactions under the act are not sales but security transactions; the
apparent saleS contract is combined with an express or tacit agree-
ment that if the "seller" returns the purchase price he has a right to
keep the goods. The statute requires the agreement to be written,
witnessed and announced from the pulpit in the church 145 the follow-
ing Sunday and that it be subsequently recorded in the trial court.
Thirty days after all of this is accomplished the sale becomes valid
against the unsecured creditors of the seller.
The floating charge, as a consensual security device, is accepted
in Swedish law in the Statute on Mortgage on Factory Equipment,
Raw Materials, Goods in Process, and Manufactured Goods. 149 The
mortgage is available to industries, hotels, restaurants and pharmacies.
The security interest is valid in proceeds and in things acquired after
the recording of the mortgage. While it can only be alleged in bank-
ruptcy, seizure by mortgagor's creditors of the collateral is sufficient
ground for the mortagee to have the mortgagor declared bankrupt. In
1932 a similar Statute on Mortgage of Farm Equipment 147 was enacted
followed in 1958 by one on Mortgage on Petroleum Stock.' 48
A separate statute deals with security interests in crops. Because
the price of grain drops considerably at harvest time, the Statute on
Mortgage on Crops" 9 was enacted in 1924 enabling the farmers to
stabilize their offering price throughout the year. By the terms of the
statute the crops must be reaped on the farm, stored and inspected by
two witnesses and the mortgage recorded. This security device is
valid for a year and does not conflict with the security interest of a
conditional seller as the crops must be reaped on the land of the
farmer seeking the mortgage, which means that they cannot be acquired
under a conditional sales contract.
B. Non-consensual Security Interests"'
There are two different types of non-consensual security interests
in Swedish law just as in other Civil law. They differ in that one gives
the secured party the right to sell the collateral in case of default,
whereas the other gives him only the right to possession." The
145 Sweden still has a state church.
149 KF 13 april 1883 ang. fOrlagsintechning.
147 Lag 3 juni 1932 om intechning i jordbruksinventarier.
148 Lag 21 febr. 1958 om fOrlagsintechning i vissa oljelager.
149 Lag 20 juni 1924 om viss pantr4tt i spannmIl.
150 Roughly the same as lien by operation of law, Black, supra note 28, at 1072, but
translation in this area is a difficult matter, so I prefer to use a term that does not have a
traditional legal meaning in English,
151 linden, supra note 1, at 226-27.
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latter is called retention.'" A literal translation of the former would be
"legal pledge," and would actually be quite similar to what in Black's
Dictionary is called "lien by operation of law." Of this type, the most
important are the mechanic's lien and the factor's lien (in its original
function the factor is really a commission merchant), both of which
have equivalents in Anglo-American law. Another is a lien of a
"floating association in logs" (the logs are floated down rivers from the
forests in the interior to the sawmills at the estuaries). This lien secures
the members' dues to the association and reflects the enormous im-
portance of the forests in Swedish .economy. Once, farming was
similarly important and this too was reflected in a special statutory
lien.
The second type of non-consensual security interest, the right of
retention, arises in a number of situations in Swedish law. The bailee
has a retention right for expenses and for the bailment, the party
hiring something has a right of retention for necessary expenses for
the goods.'" A factor has a right of retention in samples and patterns
as well as other things that are not for sale. The landlord's lien is a
right of retention in Swedish law but is generally weaker than the
above-mentioned rights of retention.
C. Conflicting Interests in the Collateral
1. Conditional Seller vs. Subsequent Pledgee. For purposes here, a
pledge must be a thing of commercial value. It can be created by
transfer of possession, if the pledge be of goods or of a negotiable
instrument, and by notice to the debtor when the pledge is a contract
right or accounts receivable. The basic conflict between seller and
pledgee is solved by statute in Sweden. Accordingly, if the buyer
pledges the goods to a bona fide pledgee, the seller cannot repossess
the goods without paying the debt which the pledge secures.'"
Two cases deal specifically with this problem. The first.'" con-
cerned a car which A sold to B under a conditional sales contract. B
then pledged the car to C, a mala fide pledgee. When A sued C for the
value of the car at the,time of pledge, C attempted to assert the same
rights available to B under the Installment Sales Act which would have
limited A's recovery to value at the time of trial (the amount involved
was considerable since the value of the car was very low at the time
of the trial). The Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, held for A; C did
not succeed to B's rights, but had to pay the full value of the car at
the time of the pledge. If the case is viewed as a title problem, A
152 Cf. Black, supra note 28, at 1479.
153 Article 3 of ch. 11 & art. 8 of ch. 12 of the Commercial Section of the Code.
154 Article 6 of ch. 10, art. 4 of ch. 11, & art. 4 of ch. 12 of the Commercial Section of
the Code.
155 NJA, supra note 61, at 663 (1931).
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cannot get more than the car, and if viewed as a tort problem, he
cannot get more than he would have obtained from B. Therefore, from
a policy standpoint it would seem to be more reasonable that C should
not be required to do any more than indemnify A for the effects caused
by his mala fide action.
In the second case,' the seller sold an automobile on conditional
sale to A who in turn sold his rights under the contract to B. When A
went into bankruptcy B obtained possession of the car paying the
outstanding purchase price to the seller. The trustee in bankruptcy
then sued B for return of the car against payment of what B had paid
the seller. The lower court found for the trustee. On appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed holding that B's contract with A was invalid as
against A's trustee in bankruptcy on the ground that it was only by
reason of A's bankruptcy that B was able to obtain possession of the
car. This avoided the problem that the trial court struggled with,
namely, how to classify the contract between A and B, which they
concluded to be one of pledge. If this is also the Supreme Court's con-
clusion, it means that the right of the buyer is not a contract right,
otherwise notice to the seller and not transfer of possession would have
been the decisive factor. In any event the decision means that the
buyer cannot use his right under the contract as security. He cannot
pledge this right without giving up possession of the car and this he
could not do under the terms of the contract. This is a wise ruling.
The buyer should be viewed as the owner of the goods and to allow him
to pledge the goods without transfer of possession would violate the
basic principles of Swedish pledge law.
2. Conditional Seller vs. Subsequent Buyer. A conflict between a
conditional sale and a transaction according to the Statute on Sales
without Transfer of Possession occurs when the conditional buyer
sells the goods under the statute without telling his buyer that he has
not made the last payment. The publication measures in the statute for
a Sale without Transfer of Possession are not equivalent to possession
in a double sale. The general rule in Sweden is that if A sells a chattel
to B and later to C and C gets possession of it, he may keep it (whether
B has a right to acquire it against the price paid by C is not certain).
If B gets posession first, he keeps the goods. However, if B is a buyer
under the Statute on Sales without Transfer of Possession, and C gets
possession of the goods, C will still prevail. 157
It is against this background that the principal Swedish case"
on this point was decided in 1958. The Supreme Court found for the
conditional seller reasoning that since the ultimate buyer, after
358 NJA, supra note 61, at 44 (1936).
157 linden, supra note 1, at 119-21.
358 NJA, supra note 61, at 117 (1958).
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publication measures according to the statute, had left the goods in
the possession of the conditional buyer, he should have no "better
right" to the goods than the conditional buyer, regardless of good faith.
Of course this was no reason; it was only a statement of the rule that
the Supreme Court had decided to follow. The use of the words "better
right" indicates that the Court has regarded it as a title question and
as the conditional seller retains the ownership the situation is analogous
to the double sale.
3. Conditional Seller vs. Subsequent Mortgagees. It is quite clear
from the draftsmen's comments on the Statute on Mortgages on
Farm Equipmentl" that the conditional seller should prevail over the
mortgagee. This solution is accepted as existing law by the doctri-
naires' and has won approval in the dictum of a 1952 case.' How-
ever, Liidgberg,"` questioning the soundness of the rule, takes an
opposite view. His main argument  for letting the mortgagee prevail
is that the mortgage is better publicized (recording) than the con-
ditional sale. On the other hand, he points out that conditional sales are
very frequent and that credit against the Mortgage on Factory Equip-
ment, etc., is expensive, but does not feel that this is enough to sway
his judgment.
4. Conditional Seller vs. Holders of Liens by Operation of Law.
The conflict between the conditional sale and the mechanic's lien has
very practical overtones judging from the case law on this issue. The
common situation involves an automobile left to a repair shop by the
conditional buyer who can pay neither the seller nor the repair shop.
The latter then refuses to deliver the car to the seller until the repair bill
is paid. The court sanctions this right of retention, the outer limit of
which was settled in a 1924 case. 16 ' There the repair shop had two
claims, but between repair jobs the buyer had been in possession of
the car. The court awarded priority to.the repair shop but only for the
last claim. This is consistent with the general rule that possessory
security requires continuous possession.
With respect to liens in general, the views expressed by Justice
Alexandersonl" are perhaps the most indicative of Swedish policy. He
159 NJA H, supra note 124, at 211, 223 (1932) (comment by the Minister of
Justice)
100 LOgdberg, Studier over fOrlagointechningoinstitutet (Studies on the Mortgage on
Factory Equipment, etc.) 290-95 (1947) (hereinafter cited as LOgdberg).
101 NJA, supra note 61, at 195 (1952). The issue was whether the mortgagee or the
unsecured creditors had the right to the goods, once the seller had been paid off by the
trustee in bankruptcy. The court held for the mortgagee.
162 Lagdberg, supra note 160, at 290-95.
363 NJA, supra note 61, at 581 (1924). This question was not the main issue and
was not appealed to the Supreme Court, hence the absence of any reasons for the
decision.
NJA, supra note 61, at 650 (1936) (concurring opinion). It should be noted
that at this time the mechanic's lien was rather a right of retention; the right to sell the
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treats all non-consensual security interests as a class, favoring those
which require transfer of possession. Thus the mechanic's and the
bailee's lien would have priority over the conditional sale whereas the
landlord's lien would not. He takes this position, even though it could
be argued that the collateral was brought within the landlord's sphere
of control, for the simple reason that no voluntary act of transfer
could be alleged. However, whether or not the conditional buyer has
the right to transfer possession is a question that caused Alexanderson
some concern. He concludes that he does, but qualifies his approval,
e.g., limiting the buyer's right of repair to an emergency situation in
which the seller's consent could not easily be obtained (car trouble in
a snowstorm miles from home is what he is hinting at). By acknowledg-
ing the right, he obviates any discussion of good faith or knowledge of
the conditional sale on the part of the repair shop.
Alexanderson's theory can be traced directly to early German
doctrine" which developed from the rule in the German code that
gave a right in the pledge against the seller, but was silent on non-con-
sensual security interests. The German legal writers assumed from this
that non-consensual security interests, which resembled the pledge in
that they required transfer of possession, were also valid against condi-
tional sellers. There is firm ground for accepting this analogy as a
means of establishing existing Swedish law, since the Swedish code
contains the same kind of statutory rule as to pledges. Therefore, the
non-consensual security interests will not be discussed separately. In
most cases, the conflict is not likely to arise, and if it should, the
Alexanderson theory might well be applied.
Some cases of conflict, however, are quite frequent. One is the
dispute between the landlord's lien on the tenant's furniture for the
unpaid rent and the conditional seller's security interest in the same
furniture. Swedish doctrine is in accord with Alexanderson that the
landlord must yield to the conditional seller in this case.'" Another
involves Alexanderson's theory that a bailee prevails over the con-
ditional seller.'" This question was raised as a side issue in an appellate
court decision dealing with a procedural question. The conditional
seller had sued the garage owner (with whom the buyer had left the
car for repossession), and the garage owner refused to deliver the car
without being paid for storage. The court, in requesting that the
buyer testify, indicated that either they had difficulty in deciding
whether or not the relationship was a bailment or a lease, or that the
goods was added by statute in 1950. It seems, however, that in Alexanderson's reasoning
this is of minor importance.
NJA, supra note 61, at 650, 653-54 (1936).
166 Almen, supra note 1, at 410, n.135, Vaden, supra note 1, at 252.
187 Unden, supra note 1, at 253; contra Almen, supra note 1, at 410, n.135.
168 SvJT, supra note 27, at 49 (case) (1943).
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garage owner's good faith was in issue, or both. The problem was not
squarely met by the Supreme Court until 1946."'° The facts were
similar in that the parties to the conditional sale of a car had agreed
that the seller should retake the car, which was being stored in a
garage. The trial court held for the garage owner after having
established his good faith. The Supreme Court affirmed. Although he
was not explicitly termed a bailee in the opinion, the words used
indicated rather clearly that this was how the Court regarded him.
Even though existing Swedish law follows Alexanderson's theory,
it is difficult to see why the presence or absence of a voluntary act of
transfer of possession should be the sole reason to validate a security
interest against a conditional seller. The rule adopted should be built
upon reason, considering all aspects of the two conflicting security
interests. For example, in the case of the landlord's lien, although the
rule adopted seems reasonable, the policy considerations merely tend to
confuse. This is serious considering the fact that the conditional sale
is a necessary security device. The credit allowed in many cases would
not be given if security in the goods were not permitted by law. As most
buyers in Sweden live in rented apartments, an opposite ruling giving
the landlord's lien priority over the conditional sale would seriously
impair the latter's usefulness. Although it does not seem absolutely
necessary to give security for the rent, landlords probably do not rely
too much on the security in the landlord's lien and the leases would
certainly take place anyway. Nevertheless, the result of this weighing
of arguments indicates that the existing rule is more in the public
interest than an opposite one and it avoids the legal subtleties with
which the courts and legal writers have involved themselves under
the doctrinal approach.
VI. SALE OF THE GOODS, OF THE RIGHT TO GOODS AND OF
PROMISSORY NOTES ISSUED BY THE BUYER
A. Buyer's Sale of the Goods
The effect of the unauthorized sale by the conditional buyer is
covered in the UCC section 9-307. Accordingly, the rule applied will
depend upon whether the secondary buyer is a buyer in the ordinary
course of business and upon the kind of collateral involved, the con-
sideration, the buyer's good faith and the ultimate use of the goods.
In contrast, the Swedish law courts look only to the "good faith"
involved. If the subsequent purchaser can be labeled bona fide he will
prevail over the conditional seller.' However, the test used in
1- 60 NJA, supra note 61, at 341 (1946).
170 There are situations which would place the secondary buyer under a duty to
deliver the goods to the conditional seller against the price he paid for the goods. How-
ever, this kind of redemption right seems to be unknown in common law jurisdictions and
is very rarely used in Sweden. See, Linden, supra note 1, at 107, 119-21.
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determining good faith is markedly different. Under the UCC, whether
or not the secondary buyer has notice of the conditional sale is sub-
jectively determined. It is actual knowledge or from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in question, he has reason to
know that it exists."' In Sweden the secondary buyer is not so
favored. In the first case to reach the Supreme Court, the Court held
that even if the subsequent purchaser did not know that the car had
been sold under a conditional sale and was not yet paid for, "he never-
theless ought to have suspected this." Consequently, he was bound to
deliver the car to the conditional seller.' The test is severely objective
and rigidly followed" as seen in a more recent case involving the
resale of a motorbike. The Court determined that the secondary buyer,
a car dealer, was not bona fide based on his failure to inquire whether
the bike was fully paid for because the conditional buyer was
"relatively young" (twenty-five)."
The result is that a car dealer has to be extremely cautious in
order to insure his title behind the shield of his good faith. As a
practical matter, he must either communicate with the seller or ask
for written proof that the vehicle is paid for. Why the "good faith"
requirement is so demanding in this commercial area has never fully
been explained since no where else in Swedish law is this the case.'
Perhaps it is because the unauthorized resale of cars is so common
while the other "good faith" situations are rare (double sale, theft, sale
of pledge, etc.).
171 UCC § 1-201(25).
172 NJA, supra note 61, at 523 (1945).
173
 Id. at 305 (1951). (A conditional buyer drove his newly purchased truck 360
miles south for resale. Although the car dealer was satisfied with the conditional buyer's
story that be purchased the truck for a business venture which never materialized and
so, drove south because of the better market, the Supreme Court was not. The truck
went back to the conditional seller based on the Court's reasoning that a car dealer should
know that motor vehicles are sold under conditional sales, especially where the truck
was expensive and hardly used and where the offer was made so far from the place of
purchase. The car dealer should have inquired as to the conditional seller's name and
contacted him.) Id. at 152 (1948). (This case involved the traditional auto sale by the
conditional buyer to the unwary car dealer, only here the dealer was informed that the
last payment was due on the car. The dealer paid it by remitting a bank draft. Un-
fortunately, by the device of combination, the car was also security for other advances
by the conditional seller. The Court stated that because of the payment and his occupa-
tional knowledge, the car dealer should have investigated the conditions under which
the conditional buyer possessed the car before contracting. Finding "good faith" lacking,
the conditional seller prevailed.) But see, NJA, supra note 61, at 256 (1952). (The car
dealer was allowed to keep the car where the conditional buyer had forged a receipt
indicating that he had paid in full.)
174 SvJT, supra note 27, at 37 (case) (1954). •
175
 Hessler, Nagra anteckningar om avbetalningsktip i anslutning till en ny kom-
mentar (A review of Eklund & Nordstrom). SvJT, supra note 27, at 417, 421 (1954).
However, note that many unauthorized resales do' not result in litigation because the
conditional buyer makes the last payment with the resale purchase money.
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B. Seller's Sale of his Rights
The seller, of course, can never sell the goods again once the
buyer has them in his possession, but he can assign his rights under the
contract.l 7 ' He can draw bills of exchange on the buyer and discount
them in a bank. However, there have been no Swedish cases dealing
with these transactions and relatively little has been written about
them. Basically the problem is twofold: (1) is the tranaction valid
against the unsecured creditors of the seller and (2) can the buyer set
up his defenses against the seller as well as against the bank?
The first problem has been treated in an article by Benckert 177
who suggests that a sale of the seller's right under the contract is
valid against the seller's creditors even if the formalities in the Statute
on Sales without Transfer of Possession have not been complied with.
This seems correct as the seller's interest is merely a security interest.
There could be a problem if the seller is looked upon as the owner
of the goods; however, Benckert resolves• it by saying that the prin-
ciples of the statute do not require its application when the goods are
in the possession of a third party.
A discount of a draft is, of course, valid against the unsecured
creditors of the seller.
C. Buyer's Rights Against Assignee
If the contract rights are assigned to a bank, the buyer would
seem to have the same rights against the bank as he had against the
seller.'" He can pay the seller with discharging effect if he has not
been notified of the assignment. On the other hand, if the buyer has
accepted drafts that have been discounted by a bank, he cannot
assert against the bank defenses relating to the goods delivered and
their quality or payment to the seller.'" He can, however, go against
the seller and collect damages.' 8°
Banks in Sweden today tend to discount drafts without requiring
assignment of the contract, although they have little experience with
the situation, not uncommon in the United States, where the drafts are
discounted in one bank and the contract assigned to another. Some-
times the banks give loans to sellers against security in the contract.
In this case a form is used, signed both by the seller and buyer. The
buyer declares that he has no right to set-off against the bank because
178 UCC § 9-102. Sale by the seller of his rights under the contract is a security
transaction whether or not the assignment is the security for a loan or whether the
contract right or account is sold.
177 Benckert, Om Overratelse av avbetalningskontrackt till sakerhet fur saljarens gild
(Assignment of the Installment Sales Contract as Security for the Debt of the Seller),
Festskrift fur Marks von wiirtemberg 1931, 31 passim (1931).
178 Rodhe, Obligationsratt (The Law of Obligations) ¶1 62, n.3 (1956).
in Hult, Vardepappersratt (Bills & Notes) 104 (3d ed. 1961).
180
 NJA II, supra note 124, at 259, 293 (1953).
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of counter-claims against the seller and that in case the goods shall
be repossessed according to the contract, he will deliver them to the
bank and not to the seller. Finally, it is interesting to note that lately
it has become more and more frequent for the seller not to discount the
drafts to the bank, but only to assign them as security for advances
by the bank. The seller in this case endorses the drafts and delivers
them to the bank. When they become due they are remitted to the
The Uniform Commercial Code section most relevant to this dis-
cussion is perhaps 9 -306(5) which sets out the rules dealing with the
security conflict that results when the seller or secured party re-
possesses the goods after the seller has transferred the account.
VII. DEFAULT
In Article 9 of the UCC, Part 5 deals with default. Spivack calls
this part unique in that "the remedies of a secured party following
the debtor's default are substantially what a businessman would expect
those remedies to be."'" He is referring to the great flexibility in the
rules concerning both the repossession and subsequent sale of the
collateral. Repossession can be made both with and without judicial .
process and may involve taking only part of the collateral or disposing
of it on the debtor's premises.'" This disposal can be accomplished
in any way that is commercially reasonable.' 54
One basic difference between the default system under the UCC
and in Swedish law is that the latter always requires the assistance of
the sheriff in order to repossess. 185
 Formerly, sellers inserted in their
contracts a clause giving them a right to foreclose, consistent with
American practice, but it was afforded no legal force.'" If the seller
repossesses the goods on his own, he will be prosecuted under the
prohibition to "take one's own right" in Swedish criminal law.'
Swedish legal policy does not seem to ,
 have accepted the reasoning
which appears to be the basis of the American rule, namely, that if the
seller is not allowed to foreclose he will not give the credit. Perhaps
the Swedish lawmakers consider it undesirable for the seller to extend
credit when the risk is great, and that the seller's interest does not
outweigh the risk of a breach of the peace incident to foreclosure.
181
 Banking practices of the largest commercial banks in Sweden.
182 Spivack, supra note 35, at 133.
153 UCC § 9-503.
184 UCC § 9-504; Spivack, supra note 35, at 136-37.
185
 The word "sheriff"' designates the Swedish official with roughly the same func-
tions. There are, however, great differences; the most important are that the Swedish
official is appointed and is subordinate to an authority who decides more important
matters and to whom the decisions of the "sheriff" can be appealed.
186 Eklund & Nordstrom, supra note 140, art. 10 comment 2.
187 Article 7 of ch. 20 of the Criminal Section of the Code (Straffiagen).
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However, this harsh rule is softened somewhat by the fact that at
times the sheriff has authority to act without a court order which is
the case under the Installment Sales Act. Another difference is that the
goods are evaluated at the time of repossession. Any surplus is then
paid to the buyer and this subsequent sale does not affect the rights of
the buyer.
In dealing with the seller's security, three aspects of default
seem to be especially important: the evaluation of the goods and of
the seller's claims and the settlement of those accounts; the exemption
clauses in the act; and the possibility of enforcing the seller's claim
by other means than repossession.
A. Settling Accounts
At the repossession and sale the seller has a right to the sum total
of the following items: (1) unpaid installments due at the time of
repossession; (2) other unpaid installments discounted at a rate
based upon the relation between the installment price and the cash
price; (3) interest and insurance premiums which were not included
in the price; (4) cost of repossession; (5) repair costs if secured
by the goods.'" The purchaser pays this along with the value of the
goods. If this amount exceeds the seller's price, the original buyer
receives the surplus; if it is less than, he remains liable for the
balance.
The installment discounting, item (2), has caused considerable
anxiety in the cases, especially where the seller asserts that in-
stallment and cash price are identical. In the ordinary case, the sheriff
accepts the seller's information as to the cash price provided it cannot
be assumed that the goods could have been bought more cheaply.
However, when the seller states the cash price is the same as the
installment price, this assumption is usually made. The 'conclusion
may well be a non-sequitur since such statements of identical pricing
have been recognized in book sales and in cases where the seller
specializes in installment selling and does not want to sell for cash.'"
Additional problems are encountered in the evaluation of the
goods. The statute says that the value shall be estimated in accordance
with the price the seller could get through a sale conducted in a
reasonable manner.'" This language is similar to that used under the
UCC."' The Swedish statute and-the UCC are close in their outlook.
From the price so obtained the costs of reselling and eventual repairs
and transportation are deducted, and the remaining amount is then
188 Article 4 of the Installment Sales Act.
180 Eilard, supra note 140, at 117-18.
100 Article 3 of the Installment Sales Act.
tut UCC §§ 9-504(1) & 9-507(2).
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considered to be the value of the goods." 2 Obviously, the sheriff has a
difficult and delicate task at the repossession, and although he does
have the right to call in an expert, it is submitted that the statute
demands too much of the sheriff in this situation.'"
B. Exemptions
One of the changes introduced in 1953 was to exempt certain
items from repossession according to the pattern of the general
exemption clauses in Swedish law. However, under the Installment
Sales Act, the exemption is restricted to living necessities (the seller
cannot repossess clothes and bed-clothes that are absolutely necessary
for the buyer and his family). 194
C. Other Means of Enforcement
A problem often discussed prior to the 1953 revision of the
Swedish Installment Sales Act was whether the seller has the right to
act as an unsecured creditor, i.e., get a judgment on his claim and levy
execution on the goods instead of repossessing. The amended act
resolved the problem in the negative. Under present law, the seller can
only reach the collateral in satisfaction of claim by way of reposses-
sion.'" However, he still has the right to levy execution in the ordinary
way on other goods owned by the buyer. According to the definition
in the Installment Sales Act, conditional sales will fall outside the
act if the price is not payable in installments. This type of conditional
sale is common when goods are sold at an auction and may be used in
other sales as well.
D. Conditional Sales Outside the Installment Sales Act
The general purpose, broadly stated, of the Installment Sales
Act is to protect the buyer against the superior bargaining power of
the seller. The contract clause that legislatures are most eager to
invalidate is usually the forfeiture clause through which the buyer
authorizes the seller to repossess the goods at default and to keep
whatever has already been paid even if this is a substantial part of the
price. Such clauses are now held void in transactions under Installment
Sales Act, but then, what about conditional sales outside the act?
In Swedish law, article 37 of the Statute on Contracts might apply.
It states that if a party to a contract has promised that in case of
102 Eilard, supra note 140, at 118-19.
193 id. at 120; Eilard, Den nye lagstiftningen om avbetalningskiip (The New Legis-
lation on Installment Sales) SvJT, supra note 27, at 281, 283-84 (1957).
154 Article 11 of the Installment Sales Act.
195
 Article 16 of the Installment Sales Act. The reason for the seller to avoid repos-
session under the act was that he feared that he would not be able to sell the goods for
what he thought would be the estimated price at repossession; see NJA, supra note 61,
at 160 (1945).
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rescission of the contract by default, the other party may keep what
has been paid to him and the court has a right to modify this clause if
the application of it should be manifestly unreasonable. However, this
is not as advantageous for the buyer as the scheme in the Installment
Sales Act. It is only when the court thinks it is quite evident that
the seller has made an unjust gain at the repossession will it then
mitigate the results , of a forfeiture clause. 71° Furthermore, Swedish
courts are generally cautious in using this kind of sweeping statutory
provision.
The second paragraph of article 37 states that clauses confessing
forfeiture of pledges or other security at default are void. If one ac-
cepts the construction of the conditional sale herein proposed, this
paragraph would pertain to conditional sales and the application of
the first paragraph of the article would be unnecessary.
Another problem of default in conditional sales outside the
Installment Sales Act is that of the settlement of the parties' rights if
there is no forfeiture clause in the contract. When this occurs, settle-
ment will be decided according to the general provisions of the Sales
Act.'" The seller will then have a right to rescission and damages.
In the absence of contrary evidence, damages will be estimated to be
the purchase price of the goods minus the market price at the time of
default. In a conditional sales situation the seller will most probably try
to prove greater damages caused by the use of the goods.'"
Finally, the question of the seller's right to levy an ordinary execu-
tion of the goods instead d' repossessing them has also come up in con-
ditional sales outside the Installment Sales Act. More specifically, three
questions have been presented: (1) Can the seller do this at all? (2)
If so, must he waive his right to repossession? (3) If he does not have
to waive his right to repossession, and if he does levy an execution
against the goods in question, is this an implied waiver of the right to
repossession?
The three questions were answered in a recent Supreme Court
casem involving a cow sold at public auction under a conditional sale
(Installment Sales Act not applicable). When the buyer defaulted, the
seller levied execution against the cow. Less than thirty days later the
buyer went bankrupt, which according to Swedish bankruptcy law,
invalidated the execution.'" The trustee in bankruptcy sold the cow,
and the conditional seller, claiming his retention of ownership, sued for
the value of the cow. The trustee responded that the seller must be
196 Cf. Almen & Eklund, Lagen om avtal (The Statute on Contracts) 162, 166 (6th
ed. 1954).
19T Article 24, 28 & 30 of the Sales Act.
196 Article 57 of the Sales Act.
199 NJA, supra note 61, at 557 (1960).
200 Article 31 of the Section on Bankruptcy of the Code.
45
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
considered to have waived his title to the cow when he elected to levy
execution. Swedish law prohibits the execution of goods that are not
the property of the debtor; 20 ' consequently, it is impossible to levy
an execution against goods in which ownership is retained without
waiving the right of ownership so retained. The seller retorted that this
provision must have been drafted for the benefit of the owner of the
goods and therefore could not be alleged against him. The appellate
court in an opinion affirmed by the Supreme Court held for the seller on
the ground that to levy execution against the goods was not per se
a waiver of the right of repossession.
It seems rather obvious that the seller should retain his right
to repossession, if a levy tried by him is invalidated by an intervening
order of bankruptcy. The provision that prohibits the seizure of goods
that are not the property of the debtor is obviously designed to
protect the true owner. The seller, who has retained the ownership of
the goods, should riot be restrained from using means other than re-
possession to enforce his claim when no special provision has been
given to protect the buyer in default. It is difficult to understand what
the seller can gain by choosing means other than repossession. It might
be that it is easier to get a judgment on his clear right to the purchase
money and then enforce this judgment by selling the goods sold at an
execution auction. If the auction price does not pay his claim, he can
then seize and sell more of the buyer's property. This might be
cheaper and less troublesome than proving damages in a suit for
repossession. In the instant case the seller did not have to go to court to
levy execution; Swedish law permits the sheriff to enforce the seller's
right directly, if the goods were sold at a public auction. and the
buyer admits the debt in writing. 202
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Swedish law on chattel security is widely dispersed in dif-
ferent statutes. To a large extent it is not codified, and is not often
treated as an integrated whole in Swedish doctrine. The rules of the
conditional sale are applied to transactions that differ considerably in
type and function. This state of affairs resembles the condition of
American chattel security law before the enactment of the UCC. Would
it be feasible to make a similar codification in Sweden?
It would be a contribution to Swedish law if the law of secured
transactions was codified into an integrated whole. There are many
problems to which the present Swedish law does not have any answers.
Still, the need for something similar to Article 9 of the UCC is not as
pressing in Sweden as it was in the United States.
201 Article 68 of the Section on Creditors' Rights of the Code.
21)2
 Article 55 of the Section on Creditors' Rights of the Code.
46
CONDITIONAL SALES IN SWEDEN
First of all, there are not so many different kinds of chattel
security in Sweden; lawyers seldom get confused over which one to
apply to a certain situation. Secondly, it does not appear that Swedish
commercial life has been searching for and inventing new kinds of
chattel security as has been the case in the United States. Some of the
possibilities of chattel security that were created by the government to
help certain strata of the population have actually been used very
little, such as the mortgage on farm equipment." 3 As far as can be
judged from the information available, conditional sales are used less
in Sweden than in the United States. Furthermore, the amount of
litigation in the area seems to be much less in Sweden; the cases
cited herein are practically all that have been reported.
The conclusion, then, would be that a codification such as Article
9 of the UCC, although profitable, might be a little premature in
Sweden. Perhaps this is more a statement of political plausibility than
of desirability; it is not probable that the government will initiate new
legislation in an area about which few complaints have been made.
203 Schmidt, supra note 2, at 234.
47
